By any yardstick, a price/sales ratio of 72 is ludicrous. It's the kind of thing that can only happen within the safety of a financial bubble.
By any yardstick, a price/sales ratio of 72 is ludicrous. It's the kind of thing that can only happen within the safety of a financial bubble.
Definitely a crazy multiplier, but not the craziest on the market given other parameters.
I hope they succeed, but if they don't - I hope people realize the value of the ad revenue model.
If not 72, what revenue multiples are more appropriate as per the yardsticks you are familiar with?
And that doesn't take into account that Substack is doubling every 6 months So Substack is 2 doublings or 12 months away of growth from bringing it's multiple to the industry standard, that might be an aggressive evaluation but it doesn't seem insane.
[0] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1243565/substack-paid-su...
* Not to mention most VC deals are sweeter than a pure purchase (in terms of being protected from a down round etc.. *
Seems incredibly risky and not strong enough to weather any economic downturn.
Are companies just copying the Facebook mantra from 2005ish? Didn't FB become immediately profitable once they started selling ads? That was pre ipo.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/268604/annual-revenue-of...
https://www.statista.com/statistics/277229/facebooks-annual-...
It means nothing to look at revenue and valuation alone.
look at the Amazon example. they were unprofitable for a very very long time. and the retail business is still very miniscule margins
No, AWS wasn’t born from Amazon selling excess capacity.
That’s just like saying that if every company rehired its first CEO it could be worth multiple trillions.
Profit? Niche ownership? Reliability? Durability? Expertise?
It makes sense to worship the Church of Scale in a VC-adjacent forum like HN, but it’s not the only way to business.
The whole premise of the VC/PE business is profits, just with different risk strategies.
Obviously this is pretty reductive but this is generally what I have seen as a user of many apps in the past 10 years.
Ideally? To leave retail investors and pension funds holding the bag when it all blows up.
Hopefully with the end of the easy money era this ridiculous business model dies out for good.
They just need to scale back their hiring excesses and bullshit jobs likely created.
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/04/16/how-substa...
the only value of the platform is in the creators, any team of devs can clone the product in a month. You're exactly right that they need barely any employees, because the technology isn't worth anything. The site has no moat or network effects so they will effectively need to subsidize the creators forever or not charge them anything, lest they run for the next platform.
It's the same reason the ridesharing industry is a profitless money pit. Undifferentiated, easily copiable products compete each other into the ground on subsidized investor money while owning no assets of value.
It's differentiated to something like Medium because I know I won't get ads, pop-ups, arbitrary paywalls, cheesy SEO content, etc.
I worked at an energy trading desk some years ago, and market intelligence there came through hyper-focused industry newsletters, with crazy high subscription prices. It's like a Bloomberg terminal, or a Photoshop subscription: only worth subscribing if you are making several multiples of the cost back in profits.
Substack's litany of 'investing' newsletters is basically a mommy blog version of that. Newsletters can't charge very much because we all know this stuff is available elsewhere, in higher quality. And non-financial newsletters probably can't charge at all, other than the small handful you see on their "Featured" page.