Yes, and I also leave out (as, hiwever, does Thomas as well) that many of the substantive due process cases, including the line of marriage cases including Loving and Obergefell, were, in their own decisions, were found to be mandated independently by each due process and equal protection clauses, such that the Privileges and Immunities clause analysis Thomas suggests would be entirely superfluous unless the Court not only through our the substantive due process theory but also just read the Equal Protection Clause into a nullity.

Thomas also leaves out that the Court has (long before coming up with the Substantive Due Process theory he calls on it to reject), actually already done the P&I analysis he calls for and rejected the idea that that clause covers anything other than explicitly enumerated rights, and only (as it expressly states, so it would take a rather tendentious reading to remove this limitation) those of citizens (note that this problem would not exist with the Ninth Amendment which is fairly explicitly about unenumerated rights and, along with the EPC, is a more commonly cited alternative basis for the same rights that have been found on substantive due process grounds raises in legal scholarship, concurrences, and even, IIRC, expressly in some substantive due process decisions as an express concurrent ground for the decision the way the EPC is in the marriage cases and some others.

> Also, I’d be curious to know if any other advanced democracy has a doctrine similar to Griswold

The US doesn't even have a doctrine similar to Griswold; the right in Griswold was upheld by later cases on a substantive due process basis (closer to Byron and Harlan’s concurrence), but Griswold itself wasn't actually a substantive due process case.