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Comment by Gwarzo | Hacker News Reader

This is a little bit of an emotional take I think.

The burden of proof is on the claim that you can get there through computation, not otherwise.

We do not understand the fundamental reality of consciousness, this does not mean that consciousness is magic. The assertion that you cannot get there from computation implies there is a currently non understood yet essential piece of physics(I assume, but I do not know) which doesn't fall under "computation". A laymans initial thoughts point this towards the quantum realm.

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I get into a vehicle every day that I don't fully understand, yet it still seems to perform its function.

I use vast swathes of computational resources every day for various tasks, the operation of which I understand even less. They still seem to accomplish those tasks without issue.

Sometimes those computational resources run ML workloads. Very very few people on this planet can honestly claim to understand how neural networks work, and in many cases, the minutiae are inscrutable to all of us. They still seem to work fine.

I most certainly do not understand how my own brain works, yet here it is, shitposting on hackernews.

We have yet to find a single shred of evidence that the human brain makes use of quantum principles in aggregate to do its thing, and have even specifically excluded a few such explanations. And even if consciousness strictly requires quantum hardware...we'll get there eventually.

Although you're certainly right about one thing, most laypeople would have a real tough time accepting a world where consciousness is synthetically reproducible, and instead tend to reach for comforting thoughts of "maybe quantum is required", "maybe consciousness is magic" or "maybe consciousness can only be created by a deity".

Non-laypeople know that at normal temperatures and pressures, quantum effects don't really extend into the macroscopic realm.

> We have yet to find a single shred of evidence that the human brain makes use of quantum principles in aggregate to do its thing, and have even specifically excluded a few such explanations. And even if consciousness strictly requires quantum hardware...we'll get there eventually.

Isn't a random generator for a neural network act as its "inception"? If so, it's exactly quantum principles in aggregate.

Why would a random generator be important for a neutral network?

Furthermore, not all sources of noise/randomness arise from quantum measurement (the only part of QM which can be interpreted to have randomness at all). Classical chaotic systems are also random if you were unable to measure the initial conditions to cosmic precision.

In fact, it's unclear at the moment how QM can actually give rise to randomness. In principle, in QM a perfectly isolated system of any complexity would behave entirely linearly with no randomness or even any chaos involved.

One does not require true random number generation to perform SGD. And once trained, most neural networks in-use today are completely deterministic. So no.

You are also making a baseless assertion that consciousness requires randomness of any kind, let alone quantum-based true random number generation.

I disagree about where the burden of proof lies. If we start off firstly with the assumption that humans have consciousness, and secondly the decently supported claim that animals exhibit what to us appears to be consciousness on a spectrum, and thirdly that we don't exactly know how or why consciousness exists, then the conclusion that seems obvious to me is that we cannot rule out that it could emerge in a network similar to that in human and animal brains. To me the best explanation we have now is that consciousness is an emergent property of a brain. And since a brain is neurons firing, as far as we've been able to determine, then there's no particular reason why certain types of networks can't have the same emergent properties.

> the conclusion that seems obvious to me is that we cannot rule out that it could emerge in a network

Not being able to rule out consciousness through computation is a far more cautious claim than 'consciousness is computation'.

That is strictly true, but if you define computation as any physical process which involves information, as I do, then defending any other position than "consciousness emerges from computation" is extremely difficult.

Sure. But I was responding to the statement "The burden of proof is on the claim that you can get there through computation, not otherwise."

I think it’s important to note that the article isn’t saying that if you build a brain-like thing, it can’t be conscious. It’s arguing that if you simulate a brain-like thing purely in software it can’t be conscious. I’m not saying one argument has more merit than the other (not that anyone is going to be able to prove anything is conscious either way).

Quantum is the go to pearl for everyone who doesn't like the idea that consciousness is not simply a result of a deterministic but very complex system of physics. Unfortunately there has never been any evidence that anything in the brain exhibits any sort of quantum computing or logic or otherwise.

Thus, the burned of proof is in fact on the the claim that you cannot get their through computation, because deterministic physics processes are all that we have observed in the brain, thus the default assumption must be that all the properties of the brain are also deterministic.

As a side comment however, Roger Penrose has this argument about some kind of quantum effects from microtubules in cells https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Penrose#Consciousness (but to go as far as to say that this might be the reason in the end why consciousness is not a computation is still a whole debate however, and his theory is far from making a consensus I am afraid)

I don't understand how this would be an escape hatch though. If some sort of quantum randomness is essential for the emergence of consciousness, it could be incorporated into an algorithm as well. It wouldn't be strictly deterministic, but why would that matter?

Maybe I'm missing something.

Well, there are plenty of quantum effects required for cells to function (everything is just biophysics and biochemistry after all), but those are irrelevant at the scale of the brain as a whole. The properties we care about (especially in this context) are emergent.

Considering that everything in the universe is the product of some computation, I would consider it a reasonable default assumption that whatever we mean by “consciousness” emerges from computation.

That this idea “intuitively feels weird” or “intuitively feels wrong”, and that we love to think we are special and have a unique place in the universe, is probably a more serious bias.

Not probably, it is a bias. Dolphin can speak, dog can speak, bird can speak too. There is nothing special about homo species except the only fact that we have more neurons in our head. Those "philosophers" love to claim that human consciousness is different than animal and this is the biggest bullshit.

We’re in total agreement, I’m just measuring my words by habit.

No, dogs and birds can't "speak", not in the same sense you do (with dolphins it's a little more debatable).

Animal calls have no syntax - each call has some meaning, but they do not compose in any way. The order in which an animal performs its calls is arbitrary, and an animal hearing said calls doesn't pay attention to it. Even basic modifiers like "no" don't exist in animal communication - if a call means "food", and another call means "no", then an animal hearing the call for "no" and the call for "food" will behave as if they heard there is food somewhere.

The exception to this seem to be dolphins (orcas, in particular), where it seems they have been quite successfully trained to follow a series a short commands in order, in a sign language (so you can sign "jump, swim, splash" and they will follow this; and then sign "swim, splash, jump" and they will do it in the new order). This can't be done with dogs, and it's even questionable if it has been successfully done with chimps.

To say that almost all animal communication is without order (syntax) is almost certainly incorrect, and would have a high burden of proof. It’s certainly been a historical assumption, but I think science has moved a little past it. Even bees can communicate relatively sophisticated messages between them.

Bee dances are a fascinating topic, but the evidence is still inconclusive - there is some evidence that suggests the movements in the dance correlate with the position of the flower, but there is other evidence that suggests they are irrelevant and the flower is found by a trail of pheromones.

In all other animals where this had been extensively studied (except orcas and maybe chimps), syntax has proven to be absent in natural calls, and also impossible to teach artificially. There are sometimes apparent breakthroughs, but it later turns out that the animal figured out a way to interpret "a", "b", "a then b", and "b then a" as four separate calls, without any deeper understanding. This is evident when you then teach it "c", and find out that it sees no difference between "c then a" and "a then c", and it takes just as long to teach it to distinguish these three calls; and then again just as long to teach it the difference between "b than c" and "c then b".

Have we tested each possible animal this way? No, of course not - but we have tested all the most likely candidates, and orcas and chimps were the only successes (and even here there is some debate). Crows, parrots, dogs, cats, gorillas, elephants, horses - none of these show any understanding of syntax.

Is this a counterargument? You are denying facts and say something juat even contract with yourself.

> Dolphin can understand sign language but dog dont. So ALL OF THEM do not speak.

Do you mean this? It is the same as saying that you dont understand Japanese and conclud that human can not speak.

Correct me if I am wrong. Or correct yourself.

I'm saying that perhaps with the exception of dolphins and mayyyyybe chimps, there is a measurable, observable, quantifiable way in which animal communication is fundamentally different from human language.

So, perhaps you can say that dolphins speak, and maybe chimps speak, and then we can even contemplate that bonobos speak (since they are very similar to chimps, but haven't been studied as much).

But dogs definitely don't speak, and neither do any other mammals that we've tried to test in this way.

Not to mention, there is another characteristic of human language that 0 animals can be taught, as far as we've tried - more complex structure, like "not (c and d)"

Well since there is full of false assumptions, I just give you a name.

@toshitaka_szk in twitter. A Japanese dude can translate languages of birds and successfully did some experiences on it. And he is kind of famous.

And needless to say Hunger the dog[1]. Did this clear your humancentric brain?

[1] https://nypost.com/2021/05/01/this-speech-therapist-taught-h...

> 0 animals can be taught, as far as we've tried - more complex structure

Also this applies to limited intelligence human infant and mathematic immature dudes. So by your logic, those underintelligence human do not have consciousness. QED.

The claims about the dog are ridiculous - especially evident with the "love you" word. In fact, most of the article is describing a much more humane version of the famous Pavlov's dog experiment - the dog learned to associate the sounds of the "bells" with certain needs and persons, and uses them as such.

The Japanese research is much more interesting, and in a related comment I also cited a published article that proved that my claims, while fundamentally ok, are wrong in the details - animal calls are fundamentally simpler than human language, but some do show simple syntax.

> Also this applies to limited intelligence human infant and mathematic immature dudes. So by your logic, those underintelligence human do not have consciousness. QED.

I never claimed dogs aren't conscious, I only claimed they don't have language in the sense humans do. Infants also don't have language, but they learn it natively. All humans learn complex structures, even the mathematically illiterate, no idea where that came from. The only exceptions are people with serious brain disorders, and those people, indeed, don't "speak".

That, again, doesn't mean that they are not conscious beings.

{{citation needed}} for most of this.

Here is an article that discusses the topic quite broadly [0]. The most relevant section is part 4.

I will freely admit that it actually refutes some of my claims - that's are actual example of simple syntax identified in several species.

Still, I believe it matches my broader point: there are a fundamental, measurable differences between human language and animal calls, with the latter at best showing only very basic structure, if any.

[0] https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2019.006...

I will readily agree that levels of sophistication of languages vary, and that human languages are almost certainly the most complex / sophisticated that we know of.

>Considering that everything in the universe is the product of some computation

This is not necessarily true. If you drop a ball it's impossible to calculate how long it takes before it hits need ground. We can calculate an approximation by creating a model, but there is no way to know if that model matches reality.

What I am saying is that the universe is literally performing the computation.

What you're describing is humans' attempt at modelling this computation using simple formulas.

All the arguments Ive seen against computational consciousness seem to me to reduce down to arguments against materialism. I expounded on this more in a root comment, and subsequent discussions so I won't repeat.

Right now in physics and the materials sciences materialism is thoroughly uncontroversial. There is no evidence for any kind of dualism, it only rears it's nebulous and poorly defined head when we talk about consciousness, and there is zero experimental evidence for it. Therefore no, I think the burden of proof is on the dualist / non-computational consciousness side.

The reductionist argument seems to be “the brain is just a meat computer and is conscious, therefore a complex enough silicon computer will be conscious as well”.

I find this very similar to alchemy in the 15th century. The idea was “gold is heavy, malleable, lustery metal, and so is lead. We have observed substances can be converted others. Therefore with the right chemical process we can convert lead to gold”. The implicit assumption is that since the two things are similar, they can be made to exhibit the same properties with the right science. I.e. lead can become gold.

This is the same as the “meat brain/silicon brain” line of reasoning. But as we learned with more advanced chemistry, lead cannot be turned into gold (at least not in the chemical way they were expecting).

So the burden of proof does lie with those making the assertion that: “meat computer has consciousness”, therefore “silicon computer could have consciousness”. Lots of people assume this is just a given without any evidence. Just as alchemists assumed from the similarities between gold and lead meant they could be chemically converted. I would postulate chemistry is much simpler then consciousness.

It depends on whether consciousness is a computational process. If it is then meat or metal really doesn’t matter. We know this because mathematicians have proved that any sufficiently capable computer can perform any computation.

So the lead to gold analogy doesn’t hold. It would be as if scientists had proved that any element can be transformed into any other element. Well, if that was true, then yes it follows that lead could be turned into gold, in a universe where that had been proved.

So is consciousness actually a computation? Of course that’s a matter of opinion. All I’m saying is, I think so yes, I think I have coherent reasons for believing so, and none of the counter arguments persuade me otherwise so far. I can’t prove it to you though, we’re just talking.

What I can say is, this or that argument seems to me to have this or that flaw, or lead to this or that consequence or conclusion that I find unlikely or absurd. Dualism is such a conclusion I find absurd, and I think most of the actual arguments against computational consciousness seem to at least reduce to attempted refutations of materialism, or out and out dualism.

> It depends on whether consciousness is a computational process.

Absolutely agree. But that is the assumption that I would liken to alchemists comparing lead and gold. We know almost nothing about the brain. We know almost nothing about consciousness. But yet some people assume that consciousness is computable just because we don't know anything else it could be (just as alchemists assumed gold and lead could be transform because they were both chrysopoeic base metals. They hadn't discovered atomic theory yet). When all you have is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail.

We know that the vast majority of numbers are uncomputable[1]. We also have proved that computation is incomplete[2] and can be undecidable[3]. It seems perfectly logical that consciousness is not computable. Or it could be computable, I obviously don't know. If someone makes the claim that consciousness is computable, then the burden of lies with them. We can't accept that on blind faith. At this point it is all opinion and speculation (as you said) because we still can't even define consciousness in a rigorous way. (and I don't think we will ever create artificial consciousness until we can define it, but that is an orthogonal issue).

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computability_theory [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

I’m not assuming anything or accepting anything on blind faith, and I don’t think I’ve given you any reason to think that I am.

If anyone says that they think it is either this or that, it’s reasonable to ask them to justify that belief. There’s no reason to resort to using language like assume, blind faith, etc.

That's not necessarily a reductionist argument if it respects that the consciousness has a drama of its own that is not related to the low-level parts of the substrate; i.e. that the consciousness is irreducible. The mere hypothesis that something can be ported to silicon doesn't reduce it; it respects the complexity of the abstraction itself.

Also, "the meat computer has consciousness" independently requires proof. Every meat computer thinks it has consciousness, and we just take their word for it, based on our own experience as a meat computer.

If the thing making the same claim is not a meat computer, then we don't believe it in the same way: "I know meat computers are conscious because I am one; you say you are conscious but you are not a meat computer, therefore I don't believe you".

In the same way, we could deny that an extraterrestrial life form is conscious, if it's not made of anything resembling meat.

> The assertion that you cannot get there from computation implies there is a currently non understood yet essential piece of physics(I assume, but I do not know) which doesn't fall under "computation"

This conflates "computation" with "physics". I think even the OP doesn't do that, since it allows for the possibility that non-computational physical processes could lead to consciousness, even derived from computational efforts.

To me this is the crux of the problem with that argument, though. The definition of "computation" here seems to be designed to get to this answer. It includes all physical processes that are not like consciousness and excludes all physical processes that are like consciousness, and on top of that presumes that humans consciousness isn't "deterministic", which to me is a difficult proposition to prove since human brains are never not being bombarded with stimuli, so creating two "runs" of the same brain is essentially impossible.

Like trying to add 1+1 on a computer that's sitting in a big burst of cosmic rays twice.

Just for clarity, I consider to be “computation” any physical process which involves information.

Right, I meant the article's idea of computation, not yours. Should have said TFA instead of OP.

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