law school grad here--generic white males are not afforded the same protections as protected classes
I can’t fire someone for being male or female. It’s not ok to fire someone for being male, or white. It’s not like only some religions are protected, while others aren’t.
You may want to check into a rebate on that law school tuition.
Heck, the cass that established gender as a protected characteristic under the 14th Amendment, subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than merely the rational basis test that is the minimum for any legal distinction, was brought by male plaintiffs against a state law placing higher minimum age limits for men in a law controlling alcohol purchases. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
The details depend on the jurisdiction, but I think we're talking about straight cis white able bodied US born men under 40?
That minority is maybe 20% of the workforce at most?
To not be in any protected class in US labor law, you need to:
(1) Not be a veteran.
(2) Not have a physical or mental disability.
(3) Not be over 40.
(4) Have neither a religion nor the absence of one.
(5) Not have a race (including White.)
(6) Not have a skin color (including any of those typically described as “white” when discussing skin color.)
(7) Not have a gender (either gender assigned at birth, perceived gender, or gender identity; including “male” for any one or more of those.)
(8) Not have a national origin.
(9) Be neither a citizen nor non-citizen.
(10) Not have genetic information.
There is no one to whom this applies, obviously.
Do you have cases which survived appeal which sustain this? Judges' opinions tend to be way more sober than they're portrayed in the media, which mostly focusses on which side won.
This [1] one? With the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Burger? Burger the Ike supporter and Nixon appointee, now somehow a "liberal judge"?
Griggs vs. Duke Power does not, in any way, establish that White males are less protected than anyone else, which was the question. And your rants about it in this post wouldn't make that different even if they were accurate.
> The CRA explicitly allows testing.
So does Griggs. If, and here Griggs quotes the language of the statute authorizing the use of professionally-developed tests, they are not “designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race. . . .”; and the EEOC had, at the time, under its explicir regulatory authority under the act, specifically allowed only job-related tests.
> It was amended to introduce the word “intentionally.”
It's a big act, and I am sure that word exists somewhere in it, but nowhere germane to the case. And if it did, you, being the law-school grad you are, would surely quote it in context, and explain the conflict with the ruling in Griggs.
> The courts ignored the text of the bill and the intent of the congressmen who voted for it in developing disparate impact theory.
No, they didn't, but even if they had, that wouldn't make your case: disparate impact applies equally to discrimination against White candidates as that against blacks.
Not only does the Court in Griggs not ignore the legislative concerns motivating the inclusion of the explicit allowance for testing, it relates the debate, it's proximate cause, and the concern cited, and announces a rule very precisely aimed at avoiding the problem the provision was designed to avoid [see, most particularly, Footnote 10, p. 401 U.S. 434].
While there might, I suppose, be a not-insane argument that the Griggs Court took the wrong view of some elements of the legislative history and context, the claim that they blithely ignored it is untenable on its face.
Right before the word "or."
The word “Intententionally,” specifically, is present in section 706(g) to expressly prevent accidental discrimination from violating Title VII.
You are trying to read the qualifications other than “intended“ in 703h into surplusage, since despite the “or”, “intended” would be the one and only consideration in your reading.
> The word “Intententionally,” specifically, is present in section 706(g) to expressly prevent accidental discrimination from violating Title VII.
706(g) of the Act, 42 USC 2000e-5(g), deals with the terms for equitable relief (injunctions, focus mostly specifically on injunctions for rehiring with back pay ), which, as is often the case with equitable relief, have higher standards than for legal relief (damages). In it, “intentionally” modifies “engaged in an unlawful employment practice”, which acknowledges that an employment practice may be umlawful without being engaged in intentionally (in which case, the type of remedies in 706(g) are not available, but compensatory damages remain available.)