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Comment by pass_throwaway | Hacker News Reader

The algorithm is considerably more complicated than that. Somebody would have to get ahold of several of my passwords (and the names of the services they lead to) to figure out my algorithm. For that to happen, someone would have to invest a large amount of resources to specifically target me, in which case I probably have bigger problems to worry about than some relatively low-stakes online accounts getting compromised. For extremely sensitive accounts (eg. bank, primary email) my passwords do not follow this scheme.

Remember, the vast majority of password reuse attacks are automatic credential stuffing, not deliberate, individual targeting.

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Nobody is going to bother with reverse engineering your algorithm, or even bother targeting you individually, when it is orders of magnitudes more likely your passwords will be revealed via a garden variety database breach/leak. That low stakes online account you have? That's also the one likely to have their user account/password database stolen, which was stored plaintext.

Basically the threat model I am worried about is: random website gets hacked and loses its password database. So if criminals hack two such sites and correlate email addresses, they will see two essentially fully random passwords for me. If that happens to you, they might notice a pattern in website url and prefix/postfix characters.

  Once that happens, a criminal could notice your password is more of a pattern than a full random password (of typable characters).

But in order to do anything beyond hacking the single compromised account, the criminal would have to reverse engineer my algorithm, which, as you said, nobody would bother doing.

In addition, the algorithm is complex enough that it would be hard for a casual observer to distinguish the embedded domain name from general password randomness.

  Your scheme ideally would rely on not tying all your accounts together with the same email address

That is true, but this only becomes relevant when an attacker is manually searching for my email across multiple password dumps (as opposed to an automated credential stuffing attack), which means I’m being specifically targeted.

>which means I’m being specifically targeted

I don't know about that. Various episodes of Darknet Diaries make it clear stolen password databases are searched for any matching email accounts, which of course depends on the motivation level of the attackers. I suspect a simple "check all emails in this one database for a match in the other database" isn't that large of a hurdle. Your average CS101 class might include an extract emails, sort, merge-compare type of assignment.

And yes, like so many others here, you apparently have the goldilocks algorithm. Easy/simple enough for you to generate on the fly yet secure enough to resist all but nation-state attackers.

To that I say - congrats. But the GENERAL advice to the public at large is that the rest of humanity isn't as awesome as you are, and THEIR password generating algorithms of generated characters plus domain name are easily deduced from a single sample, thus making password managers far far superior to protecting against actual real world threats ("crappy website has lousy security and got breached through zero fault of mine") and not the frequently imagined threats ("I am the target of a concerted effort by extremely sophisticated attackers with infinite time/budget").

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