The design goal for the software was to make it fly like other 737s. The software did not actually do that, but did "something" that inspectors allowed was just enough different from without to certify. And, in case of equipment failure, or various other circumstances, the software failed completely, because it was just really badly designed. If you knew about the system, you could turn it off in case of trouble, and then the plane would fly fine, just not enough like a real 737 that you could completely ignore the difference.
Then they made it hard to know that the system was there. People who knew how to turn it off could prevent disaster.
Thing is though the pilots of the second MAX crash took all the right steps. Just too slow.
There was like 10 seconds to turn off mcas, after that a crash was inevitable.
There’s a similar failure mode in pre-MAX 737s called “runaway trim”. The giant trim wheels on the center pedestal spin in a loud and attention-getting fashion. The fix? Pull the breaker on the overhead panel.
The MAX does not have a stick pusher. MCAS works on the position (trim) of the stabilizer. The elevator feel system (which the NGs have as well) works by creating additional resistance at the yoke (which is hydraulically assisted). Neither are stick pushers.
> There’s a similar failure mode in pre-MAX 737s called “runaway trim”.
That's a thing that can happen on any plane with a similar horizontal stabilizer setup. I'm sure even a plane with a flying stabilizer (e.g. L-1011) has similar failure modes.
> The giant trim wheels on the center pedestal spin in a loud and attention-getting fashion.
The "giant" trim wheels were reduced in size on the NG (and MAX?) reducing their leverage.
> The fix? Pull the breaker on the overhead panel.
There are two switches (whose function was subtly changed with the MAX) that control the trim motors and they're located behind/below the thrust levers.