Boards do have a duty to maximize shareholder value. THAT SAID, the business judgement rule provides that judges will not second guess the board absent evidence of gross negligence or total disregard of duty. This is because the Delaware court has decided that judges are not better than boards at evaluating business decisions.
BUT! Overcoming the BJR is very difficult unless management stupidly says the quiet part out loud.
Dodge v. Ford is a celebrated case in this regard because Ford basically said at trial "Yeah my main consideration in taking [specific action] is not maximizing shareholder value" and the judge was like "Haha no, that's not how any of this works - you can't do [specific thing] now." But if Ford was like "Yeah [specific thing] would be GREAT for shareholders" under the BJR the judge would have been like "Okay, great, keep doing what you are doing. How could I possibly know better than you?"
Also there is no "need to do right by the company" - squeezing value out of the company and all of its stakeholders is completely consistent with the duties of the board members. How else would the private equity industry exist? (jk!)
A case that stands out more to me (being both more modern as well as at the federal level) is Burwell v. Hobby Lobby: "While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so." in reference to furthering religious goals instead of profit. (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/682/#tab-opi...)
I read that quote from Hobby Lobby as saying "Sure, where you own the whole thing you can do what you want, whatever, it's not like you are hurting any other shareholders" but I would hesitate in relying on getting that type of language in other fact patterns.
Note that the plaintiff in Hobby Lobby was the secretary health - not a disgruntled shareholder.
Edit: a word
Not to maximize profits. Courts give companies a wide berth in defining shareholder value.
It's not, particularly in the context of takeover defenses. There were cases in the 80s where Delaware ruled that only shareholder interests--not all stakeholders'--can be considered when a Board uses its "business judgment" to deploy a poison pill. But shareholders can have aims other than maximizing profit, and companies are free to respond to them.
The board has a lot of leeway into how they achieve profit for the shareholders, but all decisions they make must be nominally in the interest of that goal (assuming we're discussing a for-profit company such as Twitter). They can basically claim anything they do is done in the interest of shareholder value and be safe, but if they said "we know the company will lose money on this, but we really like X so we'll spend company money on it", they would pretty clearly be in breach of their fiduciary duty.
All of this would need to be litigated on a case-by-case basis, but many modern cases have found that companies can freely act to maximize the wages of their employees at the expense of dividends or act charitably even when there aren't tax breaks.
That said, I'm not sure this really even applies in the case of Twitter---I think its not unreasonable to argue that the innate value of Twitter is so much higher than what Musk is offering that its better for the shareholders to wait even thinking purely in terms of profits (I would probably personally disagree with that, but I don't think its any more unreasonable than plenty of other valuations I see)
As long as they are not egregiously and obviously acting against that goal, or taking decisions without deliberation, the law would favor them in any trial that only hinged on whether the price offered by Musk was better than the market. Basically the burden of proof to show that it could not have been a good business decision would lie with the plaintiff, and I very much doubt that you could build a solid case of that.
On the other hand, the board can easily say "we don't beleive this deal offered by a person who isn't allowed to be a public officer of a company anymore will ever go through, either because he will retract it or because he will be unable to secure funding; and we beleive attempting the deal will hurt stock prices and profits for current shareholders" and then I agree, it would probably be a slam dunk in court.
Instead, we poisoned the system knowing that the stock is all but guaranteed to tank massively reducing our market cap and hurting our ability to take out still more loans to continue our unprofitable venture.
But we're holding true to our other nebulous values.
They'll have a very compelling argument.
Otherwise, the business judgement rule is applied, where the presumption is that the directors acted in good faith, and you would essentially have to prove that it is impossible for Twitter stock to grow beyond the current offer.
Do you really think that discovery would show that this was all in good faith?
I'd bet heavily that a lot of ideological discussions would be disclosed. As that is completely contradictory to what Twitter claims is their goal, bad faith would be the only remaining option.
Instead, it is easy to expect they would discuss the sincerity of Musk's offer (the chance that they may accept it only for it to be retracted, as happened with the board membership offer), the plausibility of him having the required financing, the stock price today vs 6 months ago compared to the offer, and similar business discussions.
I also don't personally believe this is an ideological battle at all - it's much more likely to be a financial manouever or simple ego-driven ambition by Musk.
That's his publically stated claim. Whether that's what is really going on is another question.
Now, providing profit/share-holder value need not mean maximizing said profit - it just means that profit must always be considered in any business decision, it can never be entirely ignored in favor of other things.
Note that not even shareholders get to decide what kind of value they expect their board to offer them. That definition of value is set in stone by the type of corporation. The board of a for-profit company has a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the company as pertains to profits.
If 100% of the shareholders of Twitter voted to ask the board to sacrifice profit for free speech; and the board decided to ignore this request entirely and publicly announced they would limit free speech at every trun to focus on profits, the shareholders would have no chance of winning a breach of fiduciary duty trial against the board. The board has no legal duty to uphold some abstract values that shareholders hold dear, they only have a legal duty to act in the interest of company profit as they see fit.
The word "entirely" is doing a lot of work there.
> The board of a for-profit company has a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the company as pertains to profits.
This is a dramatic oversimplification that borders on falsehood, as you noted yourself in your previous paragraph. As a trivial example, the board would be entirely entitled to claim that their goal is very long term profit maximization, and that this will result in decades of losses (effectively Amazon's strategy).
We also now have "Public Benefit Corporation" as a codification of a for-profit corporation that does not have profit as its primary motivation (at least in 35 states & DC), but obviously that does not apply in the case of Twitter.
Yes, but that's still a profit based motivation. My point was that the board of a for-profit company doesn't have a fiduciary duty to represent non-financial interests of the company or shareholders.
That is, you can't sue the board of a for-profit company because they didn't uphold their fiduciary duty to represent your interest of having a free-speech platform, even if you had made it very clear that to you this is much more important than profits, and even if you owned 100% of shares [well, you can sue, but the case will be quickly thrown out]
Conversely, the board can always claim that they made free speech a priority because they believe that will help drive long term profits, even if shareholders asked them to focus on profits to the detriment of free speech, and even if profits immediately tanked after this decision; and they will likely win in a trial.
The famous Dodge v Ford was about Ford increasing employee wages and reducing prices, at the cost of profits. One of his main motivations was to avoid paying out dividends to the Dodge brothers, who were using said dividends to bootstrap their own car company. The trial found that Ford has ample leeway in running the company as he sees fit, but can't simply ignore profit completely or do things with the sole purpose of avoiding profit.