Comment by nonrandomstring | Hacker News Reader

Comment by nonrandomstring | Hacker News Reader

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nonrandomstring

Is there a moral question here about whether some things, like responsibility, are intrinsically "non-transferable"?

When thinking of simple goods or services it seems fine that I can buy a car and then sell it. That's part of property rights.

For other things like a medical prescription, driving license or degree certificate it seems correct that these things are somehow tied to an individual.

Capitalism has evolved to allow transfer of many non-tangibles. Financialisation is really the ability to trade companies, and more importantly "titles and rights". Eventually this has extended to buying and selling debts. Through this mechanism we've accepted, in the limit, the trading of responsibility.

Yet there are already obvious limits to this. If I murder a man I cannot sell that burden by contract, such that if I'm convicted another will go to prison in my stead.[1]

These carbon trades feel a little bit more like this last case than selling a car. Should one get to commit a tangible harm and then offload the responsibility? [2]

[1] actually I think this may have been historically possible in some cultures.

[2] This is a Kantian question - because clearly under Utilitarian analysis I can simply claim a "greater good is served".

It's an interesting question but I don't think it applies here.

The problem with carbon offsets is not some moral question about my offloading my guilt to another party. The problem is that there's double-counting. Going back to the scenario, "suppose X and Y are both emitting greenhouse gases, and X pays Y to stop". Let's break that down:

1. Initially, X is emitting greenhouse gases. I'm not sure moral terminology is helpful here, but for the sake of discussion, we can say X is "guilty".

2. Initially, Y is also emitting greenhouse gases, they are also "guilty".

3. X makes a payment to Y, and Y halts their emissions.

If we say that Y is no longer guilty, because they stopped emitting, then we must say that X is still guilty.

If we say that X is no longer guilty, because they purchased an offset from Y, then we must say that Y is still guilty: they started out guilty, and they sold off the rights to their compensating action (halting emissions) to X.

We started with two guilty parties, and only one compensating / atoning action was performed. There is no coherent framework in which it can be said that both parties are now innocent.

This is the stronger argument. It's more complete. Thank you for explaining. I think we don't disagree and that you recognise my "non-transferability of guilt" in your step 4. Anyway the double accounting makes a clearer case.

edit: some clarity

But carbon emissions still go down, paid for by one party. What’s the issue?

> But carbon emissions still go down, paid for by one party. What’s the issue?

Unfairness/inequity. That's why I said my question was not a Utilitarian one. I do not speak for the PP.

edit: removed possible smartass condescension

I read your post again but I don’t see what is not fair. If you look at the target sites for carbon credits, many are reforestation projects in the developing world. Is the concern that it is reducing industrial capacity there? Or, if it is paying another company to subsidize efficiency, is the concern that the money is staying among the rich? Or is it a “they have sinned and you can’t pay off sin?” Im assuming not.

I see this as “I made a mess in the street and I hired cleaners to clean it up.” Sure, I didn’t do the cleaning myself, but I’m still being responsible for it, right?

> Or is it a “they have sinned and you can’t pay off sin?”

Interesting. Yes, this is the closest of your choices. Not quite Biblical Sin :), but that will do for the moment.

Please note that I asked a genuine, good-faith moral question. I'm not making an assertion here.

I removed a remark that "perceived fairness is often more important in human-centred affairs than summative outcomes" - but then noticed that you teach human centred design and obviously get that. So let's explore it together.

> many are reforestation projects in the developing world.

Regardless of how "good" the purchased offset is, it does not impact the Kantian moral argument - in particular I am thinking about universalisabilty. I don't think it matters whether one bribes the rich or poor in this case. the question is about the ethics of transferable responsibility - for which I used the obviously extreme edge case of buying immunity from murder charges.

> I see this as "I made a mess in the street and I hired cleaners to clean it up." Sure, I didn't do the cleaning myself, but I’m still being responsible for it, right?

No, I think that's where I would differ. Let's say you made the mess the next day, and the next, and the one after... and each day you pay someone to clean it up. You're not off the hook. Somewhat like the broken window fallacy, you're still creating a net loss to society. Unless you think those cleaners have nothing better to do with their lives than labour cleaning up your mess.

Let's consider another slightly more ordinary place this logic operates and fails. Parking or speeding fines. Why do we have motoring restrictions? Ultimately it's to reduce loss of life. Careless driving or parking gets people killed. But paltry fines have no effect on those who simply see it as an extra charge to be factored into being an anti-social driver. Now suppose that instead I can simply pay another driver to stay at home so I can speed around by the local school and park across the hospital entrance.

Being "responsible for it" would be not making the mess in the first place. You're "making amends for it" - those would be better words. But if that delivers no deterrence from doing it again, a fundamental aspect of justice necessary for regulating human affairs is not served.

> Let's say you made the mess the next day, and the next, and the one after... and each day you pay someone to clean it up. You're not off the hook. Somewhat like the broken window fallacy, you're still creating a net loss to society. Unless you think those cleaners have nothing better to do with their lives than labour cleaning up your mess.

We do pay people to clean up our messes. There's entire industries of janitors, street sweepers, repairmen and garbage disposal. Which provides additional jobs, increases time for everyone else to do other things and increases the economic pie. Do carbon offsets work differently?

> it does not impact the Kantian moral argument

Do we care about some moral argument, or do we care about mitigating climate change?

> We do pay people to clean up our messes.

That X has happened in the past is not a moral argument for X

> Do we care about some moral argument, or do we care about mitigating climate change?

That's a false dichotomy since the two are not mutually exclusive.

Yes, we do care about some moral argument, and indeed all moral arguments. They often get down to the root causes quicker than 5Y analysis. For a gentle introduction to the intersection of ethics and systems theory see [1].

[1] https://donellameadows.org/donella-meadows-legacy/danas-teac...

>Somewhat like the broken window fallacy, you're still creating a net loss to society.

This an economic argument, not a moral one, and I think it's wrong. In theory.

Presumably, the idea is that if you can afford to pay to fix the mess, you have rendered sufficient credit to society to offset the loss caused by making the mess. And if we assume that both you and the mess-cleaner are rational agents, and you choose to pay somebody else to fix the mess instead of doing it yourself (or not making it in the first place), and they choose to take your money to clean it up instead of doing something else, then we must conclude that cleaning (or not making) the mess was not an efficient use of your time, and was an efficient use of theirs.

The reason this feels weird is because tons of people have way more money than they should, and others have way less than they should. Idealized capitalism breaks down in a world where rich people can sit back and watch money pour in for free from their "investments".

> This an economic argument

Yes that was precisely my point.

Robbing Peter to pay Paul.

As you say yourself, there's no basis to the "assumption" of nice rational actors in a zero sum game within in a singular homogeneous society of little Bayesian utility maximisers - that's precisely the simplistic fantasy that's landed us in this damn awful mess. Some people get away with it. Some get screwed over. Hence I am questioning such moral arithmetic.

Unless you consider that its not a zero sum game and that by funding Y there is more capability, expertise, and other general benefits being built.

The wheels of progress are at least turning and carbon is being captured.

> by funding Y there is more capability, expertise, and other general benefits being built.

but the sale of the emission offsets by Y has no stipulation that the revenue be spent on research and development of better capabilities?

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