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Comment by jrm4 | Hacker News Reader

This just reminds me of all the very cool and clever things we could be doing, but arent. I imagine a world in which your phone is actually a general purpose computer, that can be meaningfully backed up by you, solely under your control.

So when you're travelling somewhere heavy, you backup your whole phone to a trusted server (I hate even saying 'cloud' here) and wipe it (or better yet, "duressify" it, e.g. you put in grandma's number and a little porn and thats it) and be on your merry way. Restore your backup at your destination.

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A while back a woman in Boston was abducted at random, forced at knifepoint to withdraw money at an ATM, and then brutally murdered before anyone even knew she was missing. In response the state proposed requiring ATM security features like a panic button, active monitoring of the surveillance cameras, or some sort of alarm system. Of course the banks pushed back because of the long-term implementation costs and also because of the supposedly risk false alarms.

But one of the ideas that I thought sounded like a good compromise was a duress PIN. The idea being that a customer could opt to set a PIN that would work exactly like their normal/“real“ PIN (dispense funds, etc.) except it would silently alert police. It didn’t happen, in the end. Partially because the banks were strongly opposed to the “overreach” and partially because the public outrage about the abduction died down before anything meaningful could happen in response.

It was a neat idea, though.

In Copenhagen the ATMs used to have "anti gas attack" stickers on them. No idea what they did, or protected against.

A friend of a friend got roofied at bar. In the morning, she found she'd withdrawn a large amount of cash from an ATM. (Could have been much, much worse.)

To add insult to injury, the bank produced a video of her drugged out and "voluntarily" entering her pin with a shadowy figure in a black hoodie behind her. The bank claimed this was proof the transaction was voluntary and non-fraudulent, and refused to cover the withdraw.

This was somewhere in Europe. I'm 99% sure the transaction would be refunded in the US, though I've never heard of such muggings here.

A security company I contracted for has a policy when people are traveling to certain countries that they can't bring a company laptop or phone with them. They have to purchase a laptop while in the country to use and log onto the systems from there.

I’m curious because this seems worse in many ways than purchasing in your home country and carrying across. I understand you go through the airport with a fresh laptop and that gives the opportunity for the airport security agents to mess with it, but in all recent travels when I’ve done this the only time I haven’t seen the laptop directly is when it’s in the X-ray machine for 30 secs. Seems like purchasing in visiting country would be less secure. Can you elaborate?

Carrying devices across a border gives the Nation State Actors both physical access to your machine and a legal basis to mess with it - either by searching the device for secrets or by installing malware onto it. Some countries are better at this than others. I wouldn't bother doing this if I was just going from, say, the US to Canada[0]. However, China is notorious for messing with any Android[1] phones that cross their borders. Depending on what countries your company trades with, this policy might make sense.

In contrast, bulk shipments of imported devices are not usually tampered with in the same way[2]. Some countries do have similar restrictions on data import, but they can't mess with or spy on that data because you actually have end-to-end encryption in that case.

[0] I have heard reports of immigration officers demanding device passwords in such a case, but it's rare. If you're really paranoid, enough to want to do this when crossing US borders, I should point out that you should never live within 100 miles of them. Anything 100 miles or closer to a US border gives the US government power to demand your papers; furthermore, the people in border control treat this as a blank check to search for anything they want.

https://www.aclu.org/other/constitution-100-mile-border-zone

[1] I have yet to hear reports of iPhone users getting their phones searched.

[2] Yes I know "Tailored Access Operations" exist, but this usually involves shipping intercepts, not someone buying a device in a store.

If CBP gets suspicious, they will ask for the device password to gather evidence from one's phone to deport back. This happened to a couple of people I know of.

I haven’t travelled to China since before Covid was a thing, but when I went previously border control weren’t at all interested in our phones, and more or less waved us into the country once they’d checked our visas. To say they mess with any Android phone crossing the border is either massive hyperbole, or they’re doing it remotely as you run them through X-ray scanners.

If they can mess with them remotely, then it's game over for any sort of security property you think the phone has; there's no reason to think they have more capabilities than other governments or some of the larger organized crime syndicates.

Purchasing within the country is more secure unless you assume all devices sold within the country are compromised and monitored in real-time which seems unfeasible.

Of course for this to be effective you should just purchase it in-person in a mall or something, and ideally don't provide any identifying information so they can't "customize" the device just for you, otherwise all bets are off and at that point it indeed becomes more secure to just bring your own and not let it out of your sight.

> Purchasing within the country is more secure unless you assume all devices sold within the country are compromised and monitored in real-time which seems unfeasible.

One preinstalled mitm cert, or sketch CA, is within the realm of feasibility.

An MITM cert or compromised CA used to spy on the entire country would require the adversary to be able to capture, store, process and search through all that traffic in near-real-time. Sounds pretty much impossible both from a infrastructure as well as manpower point of view.

I assume the "and log in from there" consists of a very limited login that only allows access to videocalls and a few other basics to allow work to get done... Not the whole document repository of the whole company.

If you presume encryption (SSL et al) in its present state generally works, this strikes me as obviously superior? I genuinely don't understand the argument? You carry your password in your head, buy the new machine, phone home, and you're good? Ditch the machine on the way home if it's that serious.

If you're an espionage target they'll arrange more than 30 seconds of alone time for your laptop. Either overtly at customs/security or discretely when you're away from the machine.

There's plenty that's crazy about the current system. But I'd assume in your example state actors would be tracking and possibly copying your server accesses. And perhaps your server. (Cross border? Blocked. VPN? Blocked. On-prem? Easy to raid. "Don't keep logs"? Actually we do. Open source encryption? One contributor just happens to be from an intelligence agency and added some weaknesses. And so on...)

Security is really hard. For every "obvious" solution there's always going to be a back door. For every known backdoor there's going to be a covert back door which you're not going to be aware of, or a honey trap which looks like a trusted independent solution but is really state owned.

If you want a truly secure solution you're probably going to have to wait for some kind of bio-linked technology where your personal data is embedded in your physical body, and forced access either wipes it, or kills you, or perhaps both, depending on the settings.

> There's plenty that's crazy about the current system. But I'd assume in your example state actors would be tracking and possibly copying your server accesses. And perhaps your server.

Some of us have only passing interaction with state actors, e.g. when visiting a foreign country for a short term, or when crossing the border into a nominally free society with legal privacy rights (cough TSA / ICE cough). There is thus in practice ample need for solutions not secure against an all-seeing surveillance state.

The phone is a general purpose computer, and you can run LineageOS on it, with a custom bootloader.

Then you basically have 3 partitions boot, system, data. encrypting and uploading "data" can be done. It still requires little manual work, i.e. i don't know if an app can do it.

Oh I get that it's theoretically possible, but could it be "normalized?"

Android's profiles system is the closest thing we have to this; if only Android's backup/restore facility were more seamless.

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