No, they don’t store directly the actual password, they store it encrypted by a encryption key derived from your master password. A leak of the database won’t reveal any password, as long as your master password stays secure (aka is not "hunter3")
You mean, the master password that many people reuse across sites and has been leaked into the darknet by breaches of other sites? Or if not leaked directly, at least some entropy about it probably has been.
I know these services don’t store the password in plain text, but it’s still stored in reversible format. That’s a juicy target.
You only have to remember one password, and for that reason people can choose a longer and more complex one.
Then your passwords are encrypted using that master password.
So people cannot “reverse” your password if you pick a reasonably long master password.
For reference, my master password is a 27 character sentence which would take somewhere between a millennium and the heat death of the universe to crack. It encrypts around 500 passwords, each in itself 25-35 character long pass phrases I do not know.
Then I store a YubiKey which is a second factor to these accounts in another safe deposit box in another location.
So should I forget my master password: drive to box 1.
Should my house with all my computers burn down: drive to boxes 1 and 2, find a pc or phone somewhere, and I have access to all my accounts.
Should my password manager go bankrupt overnight and take my vault with them: drive to boxes 1 and 2, then click “forgot my password” on all services and use my e-mail to recover access.
Should my password manager go bankrupt overnight and take my vault with them, my e-mail provider go bankrupt overnight and take my mailbox with them: at least I have my own e-mail domain, so I can set up a new mailbox elsewhere
Should my password manager go bankrupt overnight and take my vault with them, my e-mail provider go bankrupt overnight and take my mailbox with them, and my domain registrar go bankrupt overnight and take my domain with them: yeah…then I’m screwed. I’ll migrate to a wooded country and become a hermit.
1Password vaults are also encrypted with a separate secret key that is generated locally and never stored. So you'd need the password and the secret key to decrypt.
However, without placing too much unwarranted trust in the user, consider the following:
- extensive warnings during user onboarding about how to approach setting and safe keeping of the master password, especially around reuse.... ok, but some users are still hopeless with this, what then
- taking Lastpass for instance, lock-out features for logging into the extension if you're coming out of a new geo-ip (proactive risk control)
- taking LP again, alerting to the user for successful logins to the platform from new geo-ips (reactive risk control).
- all the on-device security controls required to get into a PWM: touch/face-id logins for the apps, an official browser extension, on and on. I'd also imagine LP security is watching HIBP very closely.
Put all that together, odds are you or the PWM security teams are able to filter pretty well for password reuse for master passwords. So yes I'd expect sources/stats to be out there, or at least counterpoints to the above which when put together map a decent defense-in-depth for PWMs which isn't present in most or almost any browser extensions, to include Tier 1 cryptocurrency browser extensions which are responsible for significant more funds and still maintain good security (think: Metamask).
You don't reuse passwords at all. That is expressly the point of password managers. You generate a new password that is completely random and quite long for each independent website.
If one of the sites is breached, no matter. Damage is contained to that site. The only password of yours that is leaked for that site. The only place that password can be used is - you guessed it - that site.