[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virgil_C._Summer_Nuclear_Gener...
At the very least, you should compare life-cycle $/MWh, not $/GW.
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation....
Looking at the older report from 2018, we can see costs for plants entering service in 2022:
https://web.archive.org/web/20181227232223/https://www.eia.g...
In 2018 the LCOE for new nuclear built in 2022 was estimated at $92.60/MWh while that from solar PV was estimated at $63.20 (before tax credits) or $49.90 (after tax credits).
The newer report with projections for 2026 shows that both nuclear and solar PV get tax credits, and at that time the nuclear tax credit is actually larger. The after-tax LCOE is $30.43 for solar PV and $70.59 for nuclear.
The earliest report in this series was from 2016. The AP1000 reactors currently under construction in the US started building before 2016, back when solar was considerably more expensive. The decision to build new AP1000 reactors was economically rational given the then-current costs of solar and the then-projected costs of new reactors. The reactor projects went tremendously over budget and utility scale PV costs subsequently plummeted, so building new reactors in South Carolina today would be a much more dubious choice, but I don't fault the decisions made back then.
In 2020 in the United States, utility scale solar PV had a capacity factor of 24% while nuclear power had a 92% capacity factor:
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.ph...
Both are compatible with agriculture. Agricultural productivity under partial solar cover is higher than without, for less water input. Pasture is probably the easiest to make compatible, and there is a very great deal of pasture, although little of it is irrigated. The prospect of less irrigation need will drive solar onto more intensive cropland.
Solar and wind seem, thus far, relatively immune to corruption. Most storage methods should be, too. It seems to be because easy estimation of incremental cost leaves little scope for corruption.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solyndra?oldformat=true
> Solyndra executives misled federal officials to obtain $535 million in government-backed loans, with the help of former President Barack Obama's White House.
I haven't heard of much large scale wind projects. Most smaller scale corruption happens at the local level and rarely makes the news.
But the Wikipedia page does not in fact include any "misled federal officials" language, quoted above as if it were from there. It says, instead, "Ultimately, none of the investigations of Solyndra found any evidence of wrongdoing or undue political influence." Sometimes a business failure is just a business failure. I have not heard of any multi-billion dollar solar failures or cost overruns as are the norm for nukes.
Most wind projects are large scale, yet buy their turbines on the open market. Again, I have not heard of any big cost overruns or non-delivery.
Solar concentrator projects have not paid back investment because they have turned out to be uncompetitive, same as Solyndra, undercut by the staggering fall in cost of conventional photovoltaics. Their natural value would be for process heat, which I have not heard of being tried.