1. WINE et al run in a sandboxed environment. You cannot execute other Linux software without then also finding an RCE in WINE. So that’s multiple RCEs needed in multiple points of the stack and the attacker needs to be aware that you’re running the uncommon set up of that Windows software running in WINE.
2. The amount of Windows software installed in WINE is limited. So you don’t have a large attack surface of Windows software. That not only limits the amount an attacker can do in the sandbox but also limits the surface area that further RCEs might exist
3. Even if you could escape WINE you’re then stuck with the problem that you don’t know what the host OS is. So you’re stuck with generalised POSIX or GNU. Which might still be common but far far less common than going after Windows users.
Are you sure about this? I was the impression that there's nothing preventing an .exe running under Wine from just issuing Linux syscalls, eg. execve.
EDIT: I just tested this, and indeed there doesn't seem to be any sandboxing:
cursed.c: https://gist.github.com/q3k/e5952111283ea59ee78a7699919a055b
cursed.exe (built in msys2): https://object.ceph-eu.hswaw.net/q3k-personal/b8159d43e0698d...
$ wine cursed.exe
hello from win32
hello from linux
hello from execveThe modding community maintains its own 'anti-cheat' system called Blue Sentinel, which was updated day-of to block the RCE exploit. At least, the same day the warning was made in the Discord servers I'm still in.
The agreed upon solution to this is to make the home directory readable, then split the files into a `~/public` and `~/private` directory, which is well accepted in the server space but completely non-adopted and not straightforward in the desktop space. It's technically possible to modify your $XDG_DATA_DIR and other similar configurations, but many programs and tools still don't care and will only look for and operate on configuration files in `~/.config` or `~/.local` or worse yet just `~/.foo`.