There are definitely other texts (such as the YouTube video linked in another thread) that are easier to understand as a casual observer.
However the other aspect is that as you alluded to, a strong poststructuralist belief is that common language, by nature of being made to describe the current world, always makes it easiest to express ideas that are already commonplace. Thus to create new ideas one must also create new language.
Most of the semiotics and sociological content of postmodernism (ie the majority of it) is really simple and intuitive - it's just wrapped in layers of reference to obscure philosophy, invented terms, and overly complicated language.
Social media, and TikTok in particular, push the limits of SotS which is mainly mass media focused.
Thousand Plateaus was extremely poetic but its contents can be converted into more straightforward ideas like deterritorialisation and schizoanalysis. Poetry is just the delivery mechanism.
Also Deleuze is an example of a philosopher who has both done poetic and analytic work (including metaphysics, which is a core analytic discipline) but is generally considered a continental philosopher. I don't think the distinction matters - both "sides" just explore different philosophical topics. I enjoy both of them and the divide seems petty.
If anything, the places where continental philosophy flourished have less of this "turning the western world upside down" than the excesses in US academia (when they don't criticize them) - and some excesses of it they do share, they import them (due to US pop/social/etc culture pressure), not export them.
Well, according to us continentals, who, if not invented, highly developed the thing for 2500+ years (both philosophy and analytic philosophy, it's west-adopted spinoff), analytic philosophy is not philosophy either.
It's more of a technical than a philosophical field, or, if you wish, it's a specific philosophical application of logic, math, and co. that mistook itself for the essense of philosophy.
>what poetry does is defamiliarize language. It's impact is emotional. It isn't philosophy
That's not some general truth - just an specific school/idea idea about poetry's function.
Aristotle, for example, considered poetry more philosophical than history - because it captures the essential and distills it rather than bundle a development with the non-essential, random, and contingent (as history does).
Why? As a scientist doing theoretical work, one of my main drives isn't always to discover new things, it's to explain known things "better", where better usually means in terms of simpler concepts or with more lightweight objects, with less accidental complexity. This goal of simplicity is very central in science, with concepts like occam's razor.
> There are very few people complaining about the unreadability of quantum equations in fundamental physics or the jargon of theoretical mathematics.
I can't speak for physics, but in mathematics a lot of people (mathematicians, logicians) criticize the mathematical jargon of category theory. And in fact there are lots of people in the programming language community (around type theory) that imho is trying to make category theory more accessible by using it parcimonously, rewording stuff and making it shine in simple ways (by giving some short hints for categorists but otherwise explaining classic lemma instead of referencing them).
> Yet for philosophy, especially that which criticises the current order, this is somehow seen as discrediting.
There's critic and critic. Having a text full of unnecessary jargon does imho greatly reduces any subversive pretensions. Things will always have some intrinsic complexity, but adding additional complexity in the form of tons of implicit references (when the relevant part could have been explained succintly) or poetic writing style is an obstruction to the sharing of knowledge (which is the actual benchmark for subversivity: how much can it lead to actual actions).
Given how many people get upset by even the term "postmodernism", I think it's a worthy exercise to make the concepts more accessible so that less people think it's an exercise in trying to destroy the philosophical foundations of the West, and more an exercise in trying to understand the reality we live in.
No such path of learning is ever presented for any of postmodernism. The twin obsessions of (a) treating only primary sources as authoritative , coupled with (b) the dense jargon of the primary sources that makes it unreadable to anyone but the experts is what makes postmodern philosophy unapproachable.
This forces people to discredit much if postmodernism. It seems to be a community that refuses to expand and make approachable their work, while claiming that their work has important ramifications. That reeks of snake oil salesmanship to me.
This is who they gave the nobel prize to last year. I don't know how anyone can take these people seriously when this is supposed to be the definitive text on the Kardar–Parisi–Zhang equation.
> In post-industrial societies where mass production and media predominate, life is presented as an immense accumulation of spectacles.
I don't know if the target of the text is only academics, but certainly it is at people who this opening sentence reminded them of another opening sentence -
> The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an immense accumulation of commodities,” its unit being a single commodity.
Which is the opening of Marx's Capital. Marx was talking about (in this and after) how there were not wealthy people who owned and had a relationship to an immense accumulation of things, nor working and poor people who owned and had a relationship to no or much less things, but workers and capitalists, who had a social relationship from one class to another as well as an internal class relationship. The ruling class expropriating surplus labor time from the working class, the fulcrum of the exploitative relationship, the resulting alienation of the worker etc.
If this is the base of social relations in society, Debord was discussing the hegemonic superstructure, which became a more important topic than it was from World War I on, from Antonio Gramsci to his successors. Everything else in society aside from production - media, church, school - but especially media.
Keep in mind that Debord was familiar with Lyotard, but postmodernism had only just recently started when this book was written. That said, Debord specifically refutes postmodernist tendencies in [thesis 179](https://unredacted-word.pub/spectacle/#section-179)
Note that Debords concept of Spectacle had *Three Degrees*
the concrete reality of the spectacle, as opposed to its relatively superficial existence as a set of mediatic and ideological practices, ‘can only be justified by reference to these ^^three degrees: simple technico-ideological appearances / the reality of the social organisation of appearances / historical reality^^’
On the first of these three ‘degrees’, or levels – that of ‘simple technico-ideological appearances’ – the spectacle is simply an ideological and media-driven ‘part of society’: something very much akin to Adorno and Horkheimer’s ‘culture industry’. Seen in these terms, the spectacle is the sector of society ‘where all attention, all consciousness, converges’. This is the level of Debord’s analysis upon which much of the academic work referred to earlier has tended to focus.
Social media, TikTok, Facebook and the issues you discuss concern this level.
On the *second level* of this schema, however, and thus ‘behind the phenomenal appearances of the spectacle’, such as ‘television, advertising, the discourse of the State, etc.,’ we find what Debord refers to as ‘the general __reality __of the spectacle itself’, understood as ‘a moment in the mode of production.’ The concept of spectacle, addressed on this second, deeper level, pertains to the social operation of capitalist value, and to the manner in which society has been ordered to suit capital’s continued operation. On the first, more ‘superficial’ level of this schema, spectators contemplate the fads, fashions, adverts and trinkets that celebrate this social order; on this second, more profound level, they become contemplative observers of their own lives, because their social activity has become so thoroughly governed and shaped by that same order. This is the dimension of Debord’s theory that has been addressed by the best studies of his work. Anselm Jappe’s excellent __Guy Debord __(1993, in Italian; 1999 in English) is of particular significance here, as it deals with this theme in detail.
The second level entails that the concept of spectacle also operates on a *third level*: that of ‘historical reality’. In this regard, spectacle needs to be understood as __a relation to historical time__. For Debord, the articulation of all social existence via capitalist social relations involves the separation of human subjects from their own lived activity. The result is a historical moment characterized by a loss of historical agency; or, as Debord puts it in another letter: modern capitalism has produced the paradox of a ‘historical society that refuses history’. Thus, this third and deepest level of Debord’s tripartite schema concerns a state of separation from history itself. Although we will touch on the first level of Debord’s theory in later chapters, and although we will also discuss the technicalities of its second level at some length, this book will focus primarily on its third, ‘historical’ level.