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Comment by dlkf | Hacker News Reader

The article omits what I always considered the best argument against utilitarianism. It's basically a cutting-off-the-branch-you're-sitting-on argument, and it's due to Bernard Williams.

1. Utilitarianism asks me to choose to save 10 strangers over my own kid, as this would maximize human happiness.

2. The bond a parent shares with their kid is among the most foundational examples of human happiness.

3. If human happiness is so flimsy that I should be willing to destroy the root of my own in the advancement some abstract ethical theory, why is human happiness worth maximizing in first the place?

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Utility isn't the same as happiness. And in any event, another significant problem is in quantifying happiness, even if you were to base your decision making on it: how do you know that the decision-maker deciding to sacrifice their own kid would maximize overall happiness? How do you know those 10 strangers wouldn't be overcome with guilt, or that the pain of he decision maker wouldn't equal whatever suffering might ensue in others from the alternate decision?

Also, if that decision were made, it's not in the service of advancing some theory, it's in sacrifice. Wouldn't to do otherwise be a selfish decision? And if not, what does it say about maximizing happiness? Whose happiness is relevant? The 12 people involved, or whoever might be privy to the decision?

Some of these things might argue against utilitarianism, but I'm not sure any other ethical framework would be more immune to criticisms.

Sometimes I think these kinds of decision scenarios are fundamentally intractable, and don't really speak to reasons for adopting or not adopting any particular ethical paradigm.

> Utility isn't the same as happiness.

In theory no, but in practice it is the concrete instantiation of utility most commonly proposed. Moreover, I think any definition of utility we invoke will be susceptible to a similar critique.

> another significant problem is in quantifying happiness

I agree with this, and I think the measurement problem is insurmountable. But I still think Williams' criticism is deeper. If we magically solved out the measurement problem (which, again, I think is impossible - the question is ill-posed) I would still be opposed to utilitarianism, because whatever notion of goodness we invoke becomes trivialised when we boil it down to a liquid currency.

> Sometimes I think these kinds of decision scenarios are fundamentally intractable, and don't really speak to reasons for adopting or not adopting any particular ethical paradigm.

I think they can be useful, but analytic philosophers have a bad tendency to lean far too heavily on them. Often results in missing the forest for the trees.

This seems to assume that the 10 strangers are not someone else’s children.

My understanding of utilitarianism is that other factors than keeping someone alive should be considered. Is it utilitarian to save 10 elderly people over the life of a child? It might not be, depending on how long the elderly are expected to live, and if the remainder of their lives is as valuable as those of a child (eg, will their remaining years be unproductive and sickly due to age, while the child’s life may be full of productivity and health).

> This seems to assume that the 10 strangers are not someone else’s children.

It does not make that assumption.

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