Prediction: There will be a backdoor.
a) The code will be open source - the community can verify the code for anything untoward
b) Given the nature of the product, most implementations are going to be behind a firewall anyway, with the storage layer talking to business logic. Even if there was a backdoor, and I'm sure there isn't, not sure how NSA could get in.
Do you think there's a backdoor in NSA's open-source algorithm for SHA-1 too?
I applaud the government for putting tax dollars back into open source. My only gripe is the lack of transparency as to what this is primarily used for within the NSA (to be expected I guess). I generally like to know what I'm helping commit code to go do - although granted you have no idea what other open source projects are used for regardless of whether the lead sponsor is government or private company.
Unless a "please don't use this code for evil" license is legally binding, that's just the nature of open source.
Security flaws can be extremely subtle and 200,000 lines of code is a lot to review... Given that there's plausible deniability (we didn't do it intentionally, it was a genuine bug!), if you were them, wouldn't it at least cross your mind to try it?
Also, at some point, if it becomes popular, some sysadmin at a large foreign government agency or company will forget to firewall off a box running it (ignoring that they could also be connecting back directly - automatic updates anyone?)
It's likely just used exactly how you think it would be; to hold massive amounts of key/value data. No doubt, the NSA likely has tons of data to work with. A NoSQL approach would be seemingly beneficial for this use case.
How dare you claim I am not deadly serious about the NSA putting a back door in a database that is intended to be secure for the internet. How. Dare. You!
I've seen a possible back door or two in this or that, but nothing like "every crypto system ever".
If you have evidence of a back door in AES, SHA-2, or anything NIST has standardized (other than Dual_EC_DRBG or openly weakened stuff like export SSL) lots of people would like to hear about it.
They also reduced the key length from 64 to 56 bits. I found this suspicious and didn't accept the explanation that those 8 bits were needed for "parity". Yet, respected cryptographers say this actually brings the key size more in line with the effective strength. So those additional 8 bits in the key were not contributing to the security and it improves the "truth in labeling".
Why would they build weaknesses into standard blocks, the biggest consumer of which is the US government itself?
When the NSA had at times insisted on an upper limit for a protocol's security (e.g., export crypto), they usually would require a simple upper limit on the number of secret bits in the key. When they've submitted fixes they tend to be elegant and minimal (e.g. SHA-0 to SHA-1).
I don't know much about security, but I am vaguely aware that there were some efforts by various governments to control, regulate, weaponize and even outlaw crypto, but I don't know where these effort have left us. Are there any crypto systems with acknowledged backdoors? Are there any which are not only widely considered to be secure, but are known to have actually prevented three-letter agencies from getting their way?
That's just from a quick google. Back in the day there were stories of "A Visit from Mr. Brown" or something like that. The NSA or "some agency" would go around to anyone making crypto or operating systems and ask to be given backdoors in exchange for deals on export restrictions. Periodically a government agency in another country would find them and we'd be embarrassed. These days it's not as common since crypto exports aren't restricted (much) so the threat of, "If you don't add a backdoor we'll label your software a weapon and you can't sell it to the world." doesn't work.
Then again, could all just be a huge conspiracy.....mwhahahaah.
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9909.html#NSAKeyinMicros...
So other than this, are there any other NSA "backdoors in everything from crypto systems, operating systems, to even backdoors themselves"?
The great thing about backdoors is, when they get discovered they have perfect plausible deniability. "Oh that key named NSAKEY isn't for the NSA it's for...uh...this other agency. Yeah that's it! It's not even a key. Right Bruce? Right?!"
The great thing about people accusing others of subterfuge is how it may never reach a suitable end.
How do we know Zed Shaw is not a shill for those opposing those for whom Bruce Schneier is a shill?? What to do!