If the flash bootloader is failing to verify, I should be able to send a new one over the USB port, even if that requires wiping the device for security purposes. Defending against an evil maid attack doesn't explain why I can't do that.
More details: https://blog.quarkslab.com/analysis-of-qualcomm-secure-boot-...
I get that, but there should be something in the ROM that can reflash the device.
It already has signature verification code, which is the hard part to fit into a tiny ROM.
> Without a signed firehorse binary you can't do anything, because EDL just won't talk to you.
So... either they should release a firehorse binary that can wipe devices, or they should add a small bit of code that can wipe and flash without needing a firehorse binary.
As I read it, dmitrygr was saying that the ostensible reason you can't do anything is fear of evil maid attacks, but that ostensible reason doesn't explain why there isn't a wipe+access mode. And "the bootloader is corrupt" isn't the reason, because this is about the pre-bootloader code.
And how should they add code to a ROM of yet bricked devices?
> As I read it, dmitrygr was saying that the ostensible reason you can't do anything is fear of evil maid attacks, but that ostensible reason doesn't explain why there isn't a wipe+access mode. And "the bootloader is corrupt" isn't the reason, because this is about the pre-bootloader code.
Well, ask Google? :-)
I'm criticising the original design. Read that "should" as talking about the past.
> Well, ask Google? :-)
Why? I don't care what they have to say (unless they have something surprisingly interesting to contribute), I'm just accusing them of doing this wrong.