In order to ensure that a critical mission-goal is met, with, say, 95% confidence, every subcomponent must be much more reliable, as there will be many ways to fail. The net effect is that often the overall perceived reliability turns out to be much better than the requirement.
This is especially so for systems that have already achieved some measure of success, as a number of those subcomponents will have already done their jobs completely.
Little is quoted because it’s a hotly debated and subjective word.
So if things go alright, those provide lifespan far beyond specifications.
And Tesla seems to be master of the exact opposite technique with Autopilot.
Particular with SpaceX on the scene, it's time to start rethinking risk, because launch costs will be so much lower.
They could at least say "the doodad is designed to work for two years, but there's a 5% chance that it'll be DOA, because so many things can go wrong in space". That would be more realistic.
but there is also a position I'd like to point out between the one most people here are taking ("NASA over-engineers every part individually to avoid failures")
and yours ("here's our reasonably expected life, but could come up short")
and that is: they need to set a bar that evaluates a reasonable amount of science they need to accomplish to justify the budget.
It's not the minimum number ("crashed in flames but we learned some things")
and it's not the gloriously optimistic number ("this thing's still going after 12 years, it's really worth it!")
and it's not a fake marketing expectations number ("we'll fake the budget numbers so we can razzle dazzle by blowing past the expectations")
rather it's just, "for X hundred million we expect to spend a month taking pics in every direction and gathering and analyzing some rocks from different promising places, and that mission alone is worth it" because that's what congress is approving