I have setup wireshark for troubleshooting. That's about it. What's the role of proxies, modified DNS records etc. in this setup? How can I duplicate this?
Thanks.
For stuff using nss(Firefox)/openssl/gnutls - you can usually just ask nicely for a copy:
> The key log file is a text file generated by applications such as Firefox, Chrome and curl when the SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable is set. To be precise, their underlying library (NSS, OpenSSL or boringssl) writes the required per-session secrets to a file. This file can subsequently be configured in Wireshark
https://wiki.wireshark.org/TLS#TLS_Decryption
https://gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Debugging-and-auditing.h...
sslsplit documentation actually suggests DNS as an alternative to using firewall
Theres a number of easy-to-use UNIX firewalls. Not sure about Windows
Proxies allow easy inspection of HTTP traffic, among other things. Arguably sslsplit is itself a proxy, specifically a forward proxy
There are many ways to monitor HTTP traffic. More than one way to do it
Why doesnt Zoom use certificate pinning
(I avoid using sites/apps that force use of third-party controlled pinned certificates. What are they trying to hide from the user)
As an employee I prefer not to use the corporate network for truly personal email.
If I am the employer that responsibly monitors the traffic to and from our network, including TLS traffic, an employee that uses our network for personal use with a surveillance "tech" company service such as Google Mail, Facebook, etc. is putting her own privacy at risk. Because I can extract her cookies from the traffic, all she has to do is forget to log out once and I now have a "bearer token", i.e., a cookie, with no expiration,^1 that lets me access her account at any time in the future.
1 The type of cookie that lets users stay "logged in" indefinitely. A non-"tech" company with sufficient legitimate sources of revenue besides online ads may not use such cookies. For example, if an employee logs in to her personal bank account using the corporate network but forgets to log out, the bank website will log her out automatically, the cookies will expire.
And as an employee that actually exists in 2021, I'd tell you to get a clue.
>As an employee I prefer not to use the corporate network for truly personal email.
And that's your preference. If you think everyone shares that preference or even realizes the implications you're delusional.
>If I am the employer that responsibly monitors the traffic to and from our network, including TLS traffic, an employee that uses our network for personal use with a surveillance "tech" company service such as Google Mail, Facebook, etc. is putting her own privacy at risk.
No, you're putting them at risk by MITMing their traffic. There's absolutely nothing that forces you to do that. If you don't have separation between the network where humans live, and where The Business lives, that's what's irresponsible.
I have family members who work in compliance. Everything is fair game for surveillance. I know of someone who got fired for accidentally uploading his whatsapp chat history via work email (this is how chat history backup used to work) and they got fired from JPMorgan for having references to drugs.
You can choose not to work for companies like this (indeed I have always fully owned my machine at work) but you're just kidding yourself if you think bigco aren't monitoring everything you do.
The poster's point is that what they say doesn't match reality, contract or otherwise
Why not use the cellular network.
But anyways, my point is not whether or not you should use a personal device on a corporate network, my point is that if you do use a personal device on a corporate network you will be secure from MITMs.
My point is if you dont use a personal device on the corporate network paid for by your employer and instead use the personal device on the cellular network you pay for, then you will be "secure from MITMs".
More than one way to be "secure from MITMs".
I think the real way to be secure from MITMs is to use a device that you control the root CAs of. If you control the root CAs, you'll be safe no matter what network you're on. If you don't control the root CAs, you'll be vulnerable no matter what network you're on (but some networks will carry a higher likelihood of an attack).
Certificate pinning is what protects the main sites (who use pinning) from an advanced attacker or a rogue government who are able get a proper CA to issue fake certificates.
Which, on almost any employer-issued device on a large corporate network today, you won't.
Personal stuff goes on personal devices with personal connectivity and uses personal accounts with personal security. Work stuff goes on work devices with work connectivity and uses work accounts with work security. Contaminating either with the other is just a recipe for bad things happening, often for both the employer and the employee.
I'm using a Chromebook, which allows me to run multiple users at the same time, each with their own profiles. Each user has their own encryption keys for their hard drive. We have no corporate network, no VPN, and instead rely on attestation for authorization.
I prefer to use this device for personal use because I know how safe it is.
You mention needing to use personal connectivity. I don't think that's necessary. HTTPS should protect you from malicious networks.
Yes, but on the kind of network we're talking about, you probably won't be able to make an outbound HTTPS connection at all if you're not going via the required security infrastructure with an appropriate corporate-issued cert.
If you're on a personal device (e.g. your personal phone) on a work wifi, you're secure whether or not certificate pinning is used.
So I don't really see any situation in which certificate pinning will help you. The purpose of certificate pinning is to protect against malicious regular root CAs. It's not to protect against your employer or anyone else who can install custom root CAs on your machine, because they could also install malware that steals data directly from Chrome.
>Chrome does not perform pin validation when the certificate chain chains up to a private trust anchor.
https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/refs/heads/...
cert pinning means they can't do that unless they're also modifying yoru email client binaries.
>Chrome does not perform pin validation when the certificate chain chains up to a private trust anchor.
https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/refs/heads/...
If you're thinking of CAA, those records are not for anybody except the CAs. They're an indication to the CA "You may/ may not issue for these names" and explicitly never an instruction to clients about what's trustworthy.
It's unusual but completely sound to have CAA set to forbid all CAs, switch it to allow just one CA, get a certificate issued, then put it back to blocking them all again for a week or months. I'm not recommending that procedure, but it's sound and if any software can't handle that the software is broken.
The idea here is that all the public CAs are trustworthy but their procedures may not be a good match to your particular way of doing things. For example if a CA does ACME http-01 proof-of-control (like Let's Encrypt) and you let customers run arbitrary stuff on port 80 on your machines that's a bad combination, probably you should get your certificates from a CA which doesn't use ACME http-01 and restrict CAA.
> Anything we did differently could influence the heap layout. For example, we noticed that adding network interception could have some effect on how network requests were allocated, changing the heap layout.