What am I missing? Isn’t that a much much much much worse thing for Apple to do? Why are we only suddenly suspicious of Apple’s privacy claims with this matter?
Contrary to popular belief, iCloud data, while encrypted, can be decrypted by Apple and is subject to US law enforcement requests. *
Considering this fact, it is pretty one-sighted to see this as some sort of unconceivable act. However if you look at it from the other side would we want all American user data (assuming Russia had a company that had such pervasive penetration into American lives as Apple does globally) to be sitting on Russian servers subject to arbitrary Russian laws?
So if you only consider American interests, it’s unconceivable for us to give up such power and control over other sovereign nations, but perhaps other countries don’t care about American interests like we do.
All Apple did in China was comply with local laws to stay in business there. What Apple is doing in the US is not mandated by law (as far as I know).
From the American side Apple has marketed itself as privacy focused, even fighting the FBI publicly at the risk of negative publicity. This about face is unexpected but also betrays those of us who invested in the Apple product line under the expectation they continue this standard of privacy and security that was marketed. Chinese people probably never expected this level of privacy to begin with, but we did and we can.
* iCloud messages backups can be decrypted
Those principles are not universal because different cultures have different values, beliefs, standards, and situations. If you've been taught otherwise then you've been brainwashed by a propaganda machine designed to motivate you to support and fight wars of value imposition like the Iraq or Afghanistan wars.
Plus, no country was around to teach the Americans how to build a society back then, and you could say we turned out fine enough.
We are big proponents of democracy but not only do we acknowledge that democracy is not a perfect system to begin with (something we are taught in schools), but our version of democracy isn't even a perfect execution of it, much like how China isn't really a communist utopia. We are more like a capitalist democracy, where effectively the wealthy can leverage more of a vote (through advertising, propaganda, PACs, etc). So if all our systems are flawed, who are we really to impose our flawed values. The answer is that the real motivation for imposing our values isn't some belief in fundamental ideals or values, but rather for American interests. We didn't setup a puppet bureaucrat in Afghanistan because of democracy, we just wanted a friendly government in the Middle East. The CIA operating in your country doesn't give you relief! No, they are not there to help YOU or your people.
As a “value” democracy gets tricky. What does it mean exactly? Even within the US it takes on many contradictory forms. And why does democracy matter? Is it a worthy value simply because it’s the least bad political system? That’s not very universal as a reason, and surely not a good reason to make war.
Where I suppose I diverge is that I think freedom of expression (and, inextricably, guarantees of privacy) actually are universal values that cross whatever kind of boundary. What has nationality to do with it? Call me a myopic American but its hard for me to accept the idea that freedom of speech could be a culturally specific value.
Now should we enforce values with coercion? Generally I think you and I agree that we shouldn’t. But information technology (and, to a great extent, strong cryptography) provides an enormous (peaceful) opportunity to durably promote those values at an anthropocene scale.
Maybe nobody externally taught these values in the formation of the US, but it’s maybe also worth remarking that the formation greatly benefited from an unusually free press for that time period.
That's certainly something the Chinese people deserve to have, but it's also not our fight, especially if the people of China are less interested in it than foreign spectators seem to be. Since their economy and standard of living is rising and more or less doing fairly well, it raises questions of motivations when we really want them to do something for them under the guise of for us. If we value our democracy or freedom of speech and press more than the average Chinese citizen does, then something is probably up... and something is in fact up, because wars are usually fought under the pretense of righteousness. But in reality almost all wars are fought in the interest of self-preservation and self-interest. US foreign policy is pretty much bound to be purely in the interest of its citizens much like how a corporation is bound to make a profit. If we actually promote free speech and democracy, it'll be due to self-interest, because for the simple reason that a politician can't really justify that they did something for the good of other non-constituents and hope to be re-elected.
Free speech is a great ideal, but it's also a tool used by the enemy for disinformation, destabilization, and defamation. This is similar to how encryption is great, but also empowers criminals just as it empowers resistance to tyranny. Some peoples will choose to have less free speech for more stability, and that is their choice. If the EU started fervently advocating for more consumer privacy protections in the US when we actual Americans don't care about it too much, we'd probably raise an eyebrow too on their actual motivations on matters of domestic concern.
Personally, from a righteousness point of view, if we really wanted to help people we'd take them into our borders and integrate them into productive members of our own society. Anything else is illegitimate. If we truly believe China is going the wrong way then we should take in their citizens who agree with us, and give them the opportunity to shine here. Humans are a resource, not a liability. If we can't take them in, then it's also not our place to tell them how to go about their lives. If we really want people to adopt our values, we should integrate them. And for the most part the US does a pretty good job of this as we're probably one of the most multi-cultural societies on this planet.
Yup. Well, that, plus your third-world health-care(lessness) system, and your unbridled appetite for guns to kill each other with.
Sorry if this comes as a surprise to you, but: Honestly, you are barbarians.
China is a slave country controlled by dictators against the will of the people, not just "a different culture".
Rather than making such strong remarks telling Chinese people what they are, you can just go there and ask them yourself instead of armchair posturing.
I wouldn’t though, lest you be arrested like Michael Spavor.
Critics have accused China of treating both Spavor and Kovrig as political bargaining chips, held as part of what is known as "hostage diplomacy".
Wasn’t so much the asking questions as it was a diplomat used as a bargaining chip since a Huawei exec was also captured.
...that's exactly why I wouldn't travel to China whilst Xi is power.
If it helps. I like US better.
So I’m quite happy that Apple has to follow local rules, and I respect Chinese citizens enough to believe that they can advocate for the change they want to see, over time.
I think gun laws in the US are terrible but I recognize the US has a different history and it's not my place to tell them how to live. Simple as that.
It’s not like anyone in China can vote their leaders out or even say anything negative publicly.
This notion that you somehow can't figure out what the Chinese want, as if you couldn't talk to them, which you literally can, you could just visit China actually, just shows that the entire discourse happens at some sort of meme level.
[1]https://qz.com/2014939/chinese-internet-users-reject-beijing...
If you get a bunch of people who are completed disconnected from a constituency deciding what’s best for them you end up with the former British colony of America, the former democratic Afghanistan. As its clear you don’t know the actual sentiments of Chinese people it’s a bit ludicrous to suggest that you know what’s good for them better than they do.
Nobody fought the American war of independence on behalf of Americans. It’s arrogant to think that others need us to liberate them from some imagined subjugation.
You're very obviously using that as a straw man argument to avoid discussing democracy and democratic mandate.
Taiwanese users data is also backed up to China. This was confirmed to me by an Apple Support in China. Whether you believe Taiwan is part of China or not, I can assure you users in Taiwan do expect this level to privacy.
What we are seeing is a slow deterioration of user privacy across the Apple ecosystem, not just the US. So even if you don’t care about Chinese users data, it does show what Apple management as a whole thinks of your data.
The most seem to forget, that with this newcoming feature this is not possible anymore. Apple can’t decrypt your images anymore by request. (Read Apple’s PSI system)
There is also strong evidence that same is coming for backups. On iOS 15 beta, there is backup recovery option by authentication key.
Unless of course this is a precursor to an E2E encrypted iCloud wherein Apple does not have the ability to decrypt your images server side. I don’t see how this design makes sense unless that’s the next step
They have no access. It is end-to-end encrypted with new system. That is the whole point of on-device scanning. It is not next step, it is already there.
They haven’t announced that photos will be E2E encrypted.
If that were the case, this would not merely be a PR mess but PR malpractice of an entirely other, novel kind.
They’re being proactive, probably in a minimalist form, to anticipate regulatory powers on what is unarguably the largest or second largest platform used for illegal porn.
If FB screeners have ptsd and are killing themselves over what they have to see every day, imagine what is on iCloud and iPhones. Right now, nobody is required to filter that content while social media is. The alternative to “sure, you tell us what is illegal and we’ll scan for it” is “We’re the govt and we want to see everyones photos for the children.”
Sure, the latter may still happen, but probably later than sooner now. I’m surprised it has taken this long,
>Government by threatened legislation is much worse than government by actual legislation. Legislation is public, Legislation can be opposed, legislation can be reviewed by the court and so-forth. Allowing yourself (and your users) to controlled by threats of legislation is allowing democracy to be discarded.
In this case, is Apple being compelled to do this by the US government? Or is it a choice Apple has made purely internally? I think that makes a difference.
But I don’t see how it affects the question of whether Apple’s privacy assertions are trustworthy.
There is a choice. Don't comply and have the CCP make you stop selling there.
Apple has no principles that can't be tossed aside in exchange for a large market - in other words a lot of money. This should not be unexpected.
The best we can do as privacy-concerned mere-mortals is to take our business where those profit incentives align with our values. Apple’s put a lot of work into advertising that their profits are aligned with values of privacy, but some signs say otherwise.
In addition, the emphasis on the on-device portion of this scanning project is evidence that Apple views losing access to iCloud data as part of its roadmap.
(There is other counter-evidence: Apple rarely comments on speculation. In an interview with the WSJ, Apple’s answer to why now was that they figured out how to do known CSAM detection in a way they felt met their privacy requirements. The omission is at least slightly informative, if you think FBI pressure is critical. Finally, people more familiar with the legal context have argued it would jeopardize the program for there to be evidence that Apple is doing this work in response to FBI pressure as suggested. Finally, Tim Cook offered a more straightforward explanation and vision for iCloud end to end encryption in an interview with a German newspaper:
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Is the data as secure on your iCloud online service as on the devices?
COOK: Our users have a key there, and we have one. We do this because some users lose or forget their key and then expect help from us to get their data back. It is difficult to estimate when we will change this practice. But I think that in the future it will be controlled like the devices. We will therefore no longer have a key for this in the future. )
If so, what information would change your mind? How confident are you that this is the full story?
Apple being legally pressured is not the full story. It is absolutely true that they have been pressured by the FBI and others, and simultaneously that they also have real concerns about user experience with lost backups. If you read the Reuters story, it doesn’t draw a straight line from the FBI to the backup situation, it just points out that legal pressure is a factor in Apple’s reasoning. Apple spent a lot of money building an E2EE key vault based on HSMs several years ago, and it’s also fairly obvious that they had bigger plans than securing passwords and browser history. Yet they have not made full E2EE backup available even as an option for advanced users, despite the fact that even Android now supports E2EE backups. And prior to enabling E2EE backups (one assumes that’s coming this year) they paused to build exactly the on-device scanning system that law enforcement has been exhorting cryptographers to build since William Barr’s letter in 2018. It does not take a great deal of imagination to see the pattern, but obviously only Tim Cook can prove it to your satisfaction.
ETA: Just to take this a step beyond “someone is arguing on HN”: this argument matters because I think we all intuitively understand how dangerous this system would be in a world where Apple’s engineering is responsive to government pressure. Your skepticism makes perfect sense if you want to believe this system is secure. I wish I could live in a world where I was able to share that skepticism, it would be a more relaxing place.
What you haven’t convinced me of is whether Apple’s priorities are being driven by the pressure. Apple can believe keeping known CSAM off their services is important, and just because someone else agrees doesn’t mean the outside party was critical or the cause of the decision. We live in a society where there are lots of non-government reasons to not be the world’s #1 CSAM host, especially as the famously anti-porn company.
To what extent Apple’s intentions are sincere or coerced is important to suss out because it changes the likelihood that Apple, in the long term, will build different features that endanger its users. I agree that the platform vendor is “intuitively” a source of risk, but I don’t think what they’ve announced is any more (technically) dangerous than anything else my device already did. Even if Apple is outright lying about the contents of the hash database and what their human reviewers will flag, they could’ve been outright lying about whether they slurp my iCloud Photo Library straight out off iCloud with the keys they escrow. Besides that, there is no other possibly untoward behavior that I can’t verify locally. In fact, if Apple built iCloud scanning, I’d be at least as concerned about future features, because there I have no audit rights.
I don’t “want to believe” the system is secure - I have the tools to confirm that the system exposes me to no risk that I’m not already comfortable with as an (for sake of argument) iCloud Photo Library user, and almost all of the other risks are hypothetical. I’m even open to believing that the other risks are more probable today than a month ago, but the evidence isn’t very strong. Some evidence that would change my mind: any information about NCMEC being compromised by nation states and Apple ignoring that evidence, any evidence from Apple sources stating that they worked with the FBI on this system design, any evidence that Apple is expanding the system beyond CSAM.
Which brings me back to a question you never answered: how confident are you that the system presages generalized full device content scanning, and what evidence would change your mind?
Regarding which content governments want Apple to scan for, we already have some idea of that. The original open letter from US AG William Barr and peers in 2018 [1] that started this debate (and more than arguably led to Apple’s announcement of this system) does not only reference CSAM. It also references terrorist content and “foreign adversaries’ attempts to undermine democratic values and institutions.” A number of providers already scan for “extremist content” [2], so while I can’t prove statements about Apple’s intentions in the future I can only point you to the working systems operating today as evidence that such applications exist and are being used. Governments have asked for these, will continue to ask for them, and Apple has already partially capitulated by building this client-side CSAM system. That should be an important data point, but you have to be open to considering such evidence as an indication of risk rather than intentionally rejecting it and demanding proof of the worst future outcomes.
Apple has also made an opinionated decision not only to scan shared photos, but also to scan entire photo libraries that are unshared with users. This isn’t entirely without precedent, but it’s a specific deployment decision that is inconsistent with existing deployments at other providers such as Dropbox [3] where scanning is (allegedly, according to scanning advocates) not done on upload, but on sharing. Law enforcement and advocates have consistently asked for broader scanning access, including unshared files. Apple’s deployment responds to that request in a way that their existing detection systems (and many industry standard systems) did not. Apple could easily have restricted their scans to shared albums and photos as a means to block distribution of CSAM: they did not. This is yet another difference.
I’m not sure how to respond to your requests for certainty and proof around future actions that might be taken by a secretive company. This demand for an unobtainable standard of evidence seems like an excellent way to “win” an argument on HN, but it is not an effective or reasonable standard to apply to an unprecedented new system that will instantly affect ~1 billion customers of the most popular device manufacturer in the world. There is context here that you are missing, and I think suggesting more reasonable standards of evidence would be more convincing than your demands for unobtainable proof of Apple’s future intentions.
[0] https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytimes.com/2021/08/11/opin...
[1] https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1207081/downl...
[2] https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/technology/...
[3] see p.8: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/6593...
This is not a meaningful distinction. There are many security and privacy protections of iOS that are equivalently "policy" decisions: letting iCloud Backups be turned off; not sending a copy of your device passcode to Apple servers; not MITMing iMessage which has no key transparency; not using existing Photos intelligence to detect terrorist content etc. In technical terms, there are many paths to full device scanning, and some of those paths were well trodden even a month ago (iCloud Backup and Spotlight, for starters, and Photos Intelligence as a direct comparison).
Making this claim also requires showing that the likelihood of Apple making one of many undesirable policy decisions has changed.
> Regarding which content governments want Apple to scan for, we already have some idea of that.
I asked about what Apple will scan for, not what governments want them to scan for. Again, I see a pattern in your argument where you state what government wants and then don't state how that desideratum translates into what Apple builds. The latter is entirely the source of ambiguity for me.
> Apple’s deployment responds to that request in a way that their existing detection systems (and industry standard systems) did not.
I could see that. If that's what Apple had built, would you have a different take on the system? It seems like no -- most of the risks you care about are unchanged since you are operating in a world of "policy decision" equivalence classes.
> I’m not sure how to respond to your requests for certainty and proof around future actions that might be taken by a secretive company.
You seem to misunderstand what I said. I'm asking for an estimate of your certainty, not absolute certainty. Furthermore, I'm asking you to provide examples of what information would change your mind for the same reason you keep repeatedly calling me stubborn and accusing me of bad faith: without it, I have no idea whether we are engaged in discussion or a shouting match.
There is no evidence, either because it does not exist or because it is hidden. The best we have is inference and whistleblowers.
That said, I genuinely think we are not being tinfoil enough these days. And that is based only on what we know ( or at least avg. citizen should know ) was already done in the past.
It is reasonable to be conservative about data stored in someone else’s cloud, and there is undeniable value to end to end encryption that gives you control over who can access it. That said, especially if you read Apple’s letter in response to the PRISM allegations, Apple’s behavior seems quite consistent and sincere over time: https://www.apple.com/apples-commitment-to-customer-privacy/.
I don’t think it’s likely they designed this feature under pressure from the government or with the intention to expand it to local data on your device.
Some analysts seem to think Apple should be getting into advertising business, which would partially explain some of the proposed updates. Naturally, if that were the case, it would render Apple's commitment to privacy about as useful as T-Mobile's. Then again, I might be giving Apple too much crap. Most companies don't even pretend to care.
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-could-be-apples-next-...
What are they waiting for? Hmm perhaps getting something else in place first.
In any case, I’d happily take the other side of the bet at even odds that the security issue is patched after the child safety program goes live.
And they've also not done that. When Jobs died Apple promptly bent the knee and joined up to PRISM.
Very publicly resisted? Nope. They went along, very quietly (it was Yahoo that tried to fight back). We only found out about Apple having joined up thanks to the man that wrote this article.
How many human rights atrocities does Apple get to partake in before their credibility is shot, such that the burden is put on them instead, of proving - in such circumstances as this one - that they're not commiting more atrocities.
You're being downvoted but it's a critical issue.
If Apple is currently being compelled to do this, it likely means the US Government has a massive new privacy obliterating program underway and Apple probably isn't the only tech giant joining the human rights violation parade. It's important to find out if that's going on. We can be certain they didn't stop with PRISM.
If it turns out to be the case, that Apple has joined up to another vast human rights violating program (they already did it at least once before, remember), the US needs to move forward toward Nuremberg-style trials for all involved Apple management and all involved Apple employees (and not only them). That's the only way it stops.
Such human rights violations should not be allowed to continue. How many tech employees at these companies got away with extraordinary human rights violations related to PRISM? Employees at these companies were responsible in part and critical to helping to make it happen. Who are these enablers? Why aren't they in prison? Why is this so rarely discussed on HN? (yeah we all know why)
HN is pretty amusing about this topic. Privacy is a human right? Yeah? Also universally HN: but let's not talk about the people actually responsible for the human rights violations; let's not talk about all the techies being paid princely sums to commit human rights atrocities. Let's not talk about prison sentences for what they've done to their fellow humans. Let's not hold tech employees responsible.
The massive list of people they're demanding records for is shocking. Privacy doesn't mean anything to the current establishment, if people could just take off their partisan blinders for two seconds they would realize this and we could probably form a plea to congress as unified voice.
Give this CSAM system another few years and they won't even have to subpoena for most of the private communication they're already going after today.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender/2021/08/25/jan-6...
In fact, iMessage is the only end to end encrypted messaging service operating in the country (for example).
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-ce...
Here’s what I think the article is trying to describe:
1. It is known that Apple houses Chinese iCloud user data in Chinese servers. Apple has said so: https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/apple-ceo-ti...
2. China refuses to support Thales’s HSMs, so Apple had to build their own, presumably based on the secure element: https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/13943950780100526...
I think #2 is what the article characterizes as “discarding entire encryption system.” However, the encryption of iCloud Keychain isn’t dependent on HSMs in the same way the rest of iCloud data is.
As a result, E2E encrypted iCloud data for Chinese users is probably still safe in China. Given physical access and non-standard HSMs, non E2E encrypted data in iCloud probably is not.
It will be very interesting to track the consequences if and when iCloud moves more data into E2E encryption, since the majority of synced data is not: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2016/08/13/is-apple...