> The only vulnerability here is the possibility of a 0-Day.
That's not exactly uncommon in cheap consumer routers.
No rate limiting is as good as no authentication.
That's not exactly uncommon in cheap consumer routers.
No rate limiting is as good as no authentication.
That's, in my opinion, the only fair criticism available here.
> No rate limiting is as good as no authentication.
Trying to even load some of the links found in Google takes 10's of seconds. That's effectively a rate limit, even if it doesn't temp-ban per IP address.
Someone would have to dump the firmware to find out, but it would be trivial for each device to generate their own salt - making a potential lack of rate limit a non-issue.
Salting does nothing to protect against bruteforce attacks, which are what rate limiting defends against. Salting is done to protect passwords in the event the password data is stolen.
Latency is not rate-limiting.
I kind of agree with the comment that started this thread -- people that have explicitly decided to expose their consumer-grade routers directly to the Internet probably know about password managers. Even if you do guess the password and compromise the router, all you'll have is some remote office that is getting TLS errors because of your MITM, and best case control of some unpatched Windows 3.1 machine and maybe some developer's local MySQL install happily listening on port 3306 somewhere. That's not great, but it's a risk that some people are willing to take.
And usually with default password because not on the internet. People often forget or underestimate lateral movement and metasploit reverse shell kits.