Where is the cryptographic proof that the only thing you are scanning for is CSAM?
This is just nice window dressing.
This is just nice window dressing.
You can trust them. You have to trust them.
Oh, "provided by NCMEC and other child-safety organizations." [1]
Other unnamed organizations. Don't worry about who they are, its not relevant. Stop thinking so hard. Stop Screeching. Trust Apple.
[1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
If some men in black walk into the offices of some nice little child protecting service in Ohio and demand that they put some additional hashes into the database because otherwise something bad could happen to them or their families, does Apple really think they would decline?
It doesn't matter how secure the system is, the vulnerability is that virtually anyone can input virtually anything into the database without Apple even knowing and expose selected users that way.
This failure point is now at the heart of iOS and macOS and it's baffling that Apple doesn't see that or doesn't want to see it.
My guess is that they're somehow forced to implement this and try to talk their way out of it with some strange PR pieces which are only convincing their most naive users.