It's a global threat to privacy and freedom of information.
It's a global threat to privacy and freedom of information.
No. Cloudflare does that automatically when the owner selects "high protection" without clarifying the impact of the choices or discouraging such practice.
> the site owner cloud just as easily have blocked Tor if they where using a normal server
Not at all, it's difficult to implement to the same level as cloudflare.
I'd also like to know Cloudflare's definition of "malicious traffic". I think the main fears are DDoS attacks (which is a nonexistent threat to the majority of site owners) and scraping email addresses for spam. Which can be addressed by informing site owners to use a contact form widget instead of putting their email on their contact page.
Edit: I'm also not sure what "attacks" and "hacking attempts" mean. I'm guessing credential stuffing of admin pages? Brute-forcing the SSH password for root? These also can be prevented in a myriad other ways that doesn't disenfranchise TOR users.
Not in this context. Cloudflare-protected pages don't need to worry that.
> I'm guessing credential stuffing of admin pages?
More complex than that, but you've got the point.
Funnily, there is silence on Fastly's filter - sure, it's not active until you toggle it, but even without explicit Tor block you get the same result.
Ok, so they're not blocking complicated attacks. Just automation of attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities. And then their IP is marked as high risk. Rinse and repeat until the majority of TOR nodes are blocked. Definitely can't see that causing issues for TOR (or VPN) users.
Edit: And to comment on this:
> Funnily, there is silence on Fastly's filter
> Cloudflare is used by 80.6% of all the websites whose reverse proxy service we know. This is 17.4% of all websites.
https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/cn-cloudflare
> Fastly is used by 5.7% of all the websites whose reverse proxy service we know. This is 1.2% of all websites.
There are countless sites that only serve static contents and yet cannot be accessed over Tor.
Furthermore, many other provide an optional login that could be made to block Tor exit node, but the default settings of cloudflare still block the whole site.
Additionally, "anonymity is already lost anyway" when logging on a banking website is incorrect. Users might want to protect their browsing from untrusted WiFi access points or nosy ISPs or country-level censorship.
> (logging into a bank, for example) it is reasonable, due to the inherent risk, to block Tor exit nodes.
How many attackers have the skills, experience and knowledge to successfully break into a bank and yet don't know how to anonymously rent a VPS or use a botnet or a compromised host or a starbucks WiFi? 0.0001%?
[Edit: silent downvotes do not help.]
DDoS attacks are surprisingly negligible, comparable for ordinary IPs, so I don't think that's what they're protecting at.
Citation needed, as my Enterprise zone with security level set to 'high' doesn't block my own Tor visit (and /cdn-cgi/trace does indeed show loc=T1).