Backup key, for recovery purposes, needs to be stored in a password vault/physical safe/some external system. The same as it is with MacOS Filevault/Microsoft Windows Bitlocker.
Backup key, for recovery purposes, needs to be stored in a password vault/physical safe/some external system. The same as it is with MacOS Filevault/Microsoft Windows Bitlocker.
If the TPM yields the decryption key, then the disk is mounted without the user being present, so any RUNTIME security hole can be exploited by the attacker (e.g.: USB exploits, etc).
The Mac/Windows model just seems less-safe (though more friendly for shared devices).
I would like a shared system though: where I provide half the key, and the TPM has the other half, so BOTH are necessary to decrypt the disk.
But if you want full disk encryption for a server without the need to attend it in person to enter the password every time it restarts, you might feel the middling security a TPM provides is an improvement over not encrypting the disk at all.
Or if you issue a big fleet of laptops to forgetful users, and remote password reset is a must-have feature, the TPM is more secure than the user writing the password on a post-it note stuck to the laptop.
Or if you're making something like a TiVo where you want it to work without a password - while also locking down the device, even against the owner.
So TPMs are great if you're a big corporation!
Also great for personal NAS for example. But its bloody hard to implement on Linux/BSD at the moment
Quite true. They're pretty bad if you're just a person.
For multi user systems one can tie login to mounting an encrypted home but of course you are still required to enter a password twice although in theory it seems like the information entered first could be retained and could be used to log in a user and complete the next step.
You can also unlock using a tang server: https://www.networkshinobi.com/clevis-and-tang-network-bound...