Old-school techniques such as physically smuggling microdots[1] seem much safer than relying on any computer technology, which can always be hacked.
These firms are helping authoritarian regimes kill and imprison journalists. The journalists who survive by being paranoid will be made less effective by having to use less effective methods of communication, which likely aren't understood by the people journalists talk to (whistleblowers, witnesses, etc.)
Also reports Mexican journalist was hacked, then executed right after at an obscure location. Heavily implies GPS tracking was used for the hit.
And that's before considering that a journalist would never have a realistic chance to meet potential sources under repressive regimes on the other side of the world, certainly not a useful number.
Computers and encryption made this kind of covert communication far more accessible to the laymen. Anything that sets that back just deters people from even trying and this is exactly the chilling effect those oppressive regimes are looking for.
The difference is you need way more resources and funds to physically watch and search a lot of people than to spy on their computer communications or hack in to their phones/laptops.
Mass computer surveillance is practical, easy, and affordable.. mass physical surveillance is much harder, much more expensive, and impractical to do effectively on large populations.
You're right but old-school methods make everything impractical, hard, expensive, and far riskier for both the dissident who already has enough reasons to just stay quiet, and also for the journalist. They set a very high bar for succeeding. You're asking a regular person to take the end-to-end role of a Cold War spy and their source. And this when having access to sensitive info, suspicious purchases like photographic equipment and chemicals, trips abroad, or any attempt to contact a journalist would individually be enough to put someone on a watch list. There are only so many ways to get in contact with a journalist and set up meetings that don't involve any electronic communication.
The state can take a lot more than the individual. So the question is how many people who have sensitive information to share could or would go that route in face of this dramatically mounting pressure? Anything that raises that bar for doing it is a win for the oppressive regime because it makes surveillance that much easier.
An exploit is to encryption as a sword is to a shield.
We don't regulate shields.
Stop trying to find gotchas. Weapons (read: items whose primary goals are to inflict damage, maim, kill, injure, destroy) are and should be regulated.
That's your mistake right there
I wonder what the rationale behind this federal law is. Does wearing/purchasing armor indicate that you, convicted felon, are simply up to no good once again? Is it one of those "you don't need ~~privacy~~ armor if you don't have anything to hide" things?
[1] https://www.shotstop.net/resources-1/2020/9/8/is-it-legal-to...
Or a company for that matter, if we want to keep up the pretense that the NSO group is acting independently.
People sometimes seem to imagine some world inhibited by security-conscious professions that is more akin to a slick movie than real life. Witness the common believe that, say, blocking websites at DNS levels has zero impact on crime because it's easy to circumvent.
Real-life criminals, journalists, or activists prefer Telegram over code tattooed on a messenger's scalp for the same reason we all do: hair grows too slow and nobody is getting on international flights right now. I know it's fun to imagine all these activities involving "threat actors" and steganographic key exchanges via Pornhub (Alex and Bob getting on?). But that road leads to busywork that doesn't get any corrupt politician's name on that white page.