I feel like there's a large subset of people who don't understand what TPM does, so just assume the worst and hand wave about how it [somehow] causes [random bad thing].
In this case I guess TPM causes telemetry?
In this case I guess TPM causes telemetry?
Trusted Platform Modules can be used enforce app DRM, ensuring that only "approved" apps are able to run on a system.
That's already the reality for iPhones and iPads. We see desktops converging on this reality with systems like Apple's M1 which won't run unsigned binaries at all, and makes it difficult to nearly impossible to run apps that weren't first approved by Apple through their notarization process.
Is an open and flashable TPM something rights holders would be comfortable with? Or would they treat it like SafetyNet treats an Android phone with an unlocked bootloader?
About every time something like this is placed on a consumers product, it is to exploit the consumer some way, so, no it's just bad.
There is the very rare exception of it being a product intended for the owner to lend it to other people, and the very common exception of it being disabled by default, but being cheaper to include on every product than just the business ones. But well, Windows 11 Home edition computers are neither of those.
1. Using something not too dissimilar from blockchain/git repo hashes to attest to the the execution stack (BIOS, bootloader, kernel, userspace). 2. Providing cryptographic primitives that are only unlocked when the stack exactly matches a particular value.
It's a handy tool for avoiding spyware, as any change in the attestation chain gets immediately flagged. It is also, in principle, useful for tying DRM keys to a particular execution stack that's known to be trusted... although it's very worth noting that the TPM's threat model does not include an attacker having physical access to the hardware.
The only check the TPM does when deciding whether to allow the key in one of its registers to be used is whether the stack is in a particular configuration. The TPM doesn't (and in fact can't) directly require passwords (since it has no direct line of communication to the user). However, the BIOS, bootloader, kernel, etc... can all be configured to mix user-provided information like a password into the hash they push into the TPM.
You can in fact put passwords on most TPM internal objects. See this example https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/blob/master/man/...
That is the argument I suppose OP was making. The secure boot locking is hypothetical, but it is often feared. I get why, because it seems like something Microsoft would love to do.
It doesn't block you from running anything.
I figured the TPM was part of secure-boot validation. But given some extra thought, it is clear that verifying a signature does not require any secrets.
Yet
Note: I have no idea what TPM even is.
They were controversial because it was originally thought they would be used to lock parts of your computer away from you, being used to do DRM and the like. At the end of the day the chips were hard to use, slow, and flaky enough that it didn't really pan out. A lot of the braindamage came from a secondary feature where you could theoretically create "secure enclaves" where the entire execution chain down to the bare metal was signed to prevent viruses and rootkits from executing. In theory this is neat, but in practice it's basically impossible on PC hardware and caused a lot of problems. This functionality is the reason BitLocker had the reputation for randomly locking you out of your machine, even though it doesn't use the feature directly. The configuration registers were maybe a mistake.
("TPM is an international standard for a secure cryptoprocessor, a dedicated microcontroller designed to secure hardware through integrated cryptographic keys." - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module)
And I don't think a fully-secured future for PC's is as impossible as you think. The primary reason this is impossible right now is because TPM's aren't ubiquitous (none of my machines came with one installed). That problem will be solved by Windows 11.
Unless they're willing to allow the end user to override the wishes of the vendor (and without any diminished functionality), TPM is just another way to turn computers into appliances.
If your computation is quick you might be able to get away with this sometimes, but the potential for problems is almost unlimited. The fact that the TPM itself is pretty slow throws another monkeywrench into the plan.
In order for it to work the whole system needs to be designed from the bottom up to support it, which means you need to touch every layer of the PC stack. It's a lot of work. It is a lot easier on something like a cellphone where you can control the hardware from top to bottom and don't have to consider the case where someone installs additional hardware to suit their needs.
These things are very useful for authentication and have been on business laptops for this very reason forever.