Read "22. Does RCV satisfy the monotonicity criterion?"
Say, there's 3 candidates. You want A to win. You think A will lose to B in a 1-on-1 match, but would win C. So you vote C-A-B (or C-B-A, doesn't matter) to increase the likeliness that B got eliminated in the 1st round. Of course, you're now saying that you prefer C over A in a 1-on-1 race. But that's fine because other people will vote for A.
Concretely, let's say this is people's actual choice.
31 B-A-C; 39 A-B-C; 30 C-B-A
B wins.
Now, if 2 people preferring A (voted A-B-C) strategically change their vote to C-B-A.
31 B-A-C; 37 A-B-C; 32 C-B-A
Now, A wins.