That doesn't matter.
2. Any biometric identifiers that are created to perform the verification are never stored or retained—they are fully removed from all of our systems within 48 hours (usually within minutes).
More on this at https://support.stripe.com/questions/managing-your-id-verifi....
That doesn't make me feel a lot better. :( The images are enough to generate biometric data such as facial recognition profiles.
It's simply not legal to "not keep records" if you are running payments.
If you ran a payment to "O Bin Laden" but you have a driver's license picture showing that it is Oscar Bin Laden, from CA, DoB 2001, you'd better keep all that information for your records in case you get audited for potential OFAC violations.
> all images captured, extracted data from your ID document including name, date of birth, and ID number, and any information submitted via forms such as name, date of birth, SSN, email, and phone number, and the verification response.
How do you foresee that consent working if your product is used in account recovery flows?
For example, imagine if Steam adopted Stripe Identity as their only way to allow people with $$$$ worth of games to recover hacked accounts. If the user's only choice is to "consent" or lose their valuable account, that makes the "consent" something of a joke.
I'd be interested to hear how you plan to square that circle!
Does Stripe have a legal contract with users that says something to the effect of "if it does 1 and 2 above (by mistake or by choice doesn't matter) - that they will be liable for it". If not, all the support documents and technical security documentation is moot. I want to see "skin in the game" by Stripe. If you're so sure about "security" sign a legal contract.
Trust and goodwill is enough to get me to consider a service, not enough to sign up.
Also, data outlives management regimes. Eventually, any data set that can be used will be used.
For example: KYC is a core use case for identity, which requires us to retain ID information for audit purposes.
For businesses who don’t need to keep the ID for as long, we provide a deletion API that lets them automatically delete the IDs from our system.
No need to go any further for an example than Google and its "Don't be evil" somehow evolving into "Normalize the creepy".
They could be charging you AND creating an international ID database.
And frankly, if Stripe is offering any form of credit, it's likely working with the credit unions too.
The only way i would trust such a thing is if i have complete control over my data and how it's used (that's probably never gonna happen from a for-profit imo)
I'm sure they're not as lax as Equifax. I would hope that Stripe compartment all these documents so that a compromise of one database is not a compromise of the whole database. That's basic data storage hygiene in the information age. `Don't put all your eggs in one basket` as the saying goes.
The electronic identity cards of Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Portugal and Spain all have a digital signature application which, upon activation, enables the bearer to authenticate the card using their confidential PIN. Consequently they can, at least theoretically, authenticate documents to satisfy any third party that the document's not been altered after being digitally signed. This application uses a registered certificate in conjunction with public/private key pairs so these enhanced cards do not necessarily have to participate in online transactions.
Yet I've never seen any company use it. Everyone uses slower, more expensive private services that don't ask any questions about what you're going to do with the data they collect.
I am too, but that's not an endorsement. And more pertinently, that is nowhere nearly enough.
Every database of value tends towards uncontrollable sharing over time. The more available and more valuable it is, the harder it is to fight that trend.
The best thing for humanity is to stop making high-value data hordes like this. Unfortunately, the interests of smaller groupings are the reverse.
If there was, all black-hats would be coming from Ivy League schools. They’re not.
Nor is there a correlation between Stanford degrees and wanting to write secure code.
The Stanford thing was really the basis for Palantirs competitive advantage in the consulting space over companies like Booz Allen Hamilton etc.