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> Assuming the kernel requires executable pages to be read-only (W^X)

Which macOS's kernel doesn't.

It does require that, but it allows flipping between RX and RW at will (for JITs), and the M1 actually has proprietary features to allow userspace to do this without involving the kernel, so the kernel couldn't re-scan when those flips happen (plus it would kill performance anyway).

Plus, as I said above, this is prone to false positives anyway because the executable section on ARM also includes constant pools.

Can't a MAP_JIT region be writable by one thread and executable by a different thread at the same time?

Ah, yes, I forgot about that. So indeed there is no non-racy hook point for the kernel to do such a check, even if it made sense and the RX/RW switch went through the kernel, which it doesn't.

https://developer.apple.com/documentation/apple-silicon/port...

That link confirms that it can:

> Because pthread_jit_write_protect_np changes only the current thread’s permissions, avoid accessing the same memory region from multiple threads. Giving multiple threads access to the same memory region opens up a potential attack vector, in which one thread has write access and another has executable access to the same region.

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