One example is that different routes have different hardware requirements. And guess what, the only provider who has the right kit available immediately is the one whose contract is just expiring. Please name your price and sign on the dotted line.
One example is that different routes have different hardware requirements. And guess what, the only provider who has the right kit available immediately is the one whose contract is just expiring. Please name your price and sign on the dotted line.
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/apr/10/stagecoach-...
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/great-british-railways-fo...
And this is the actual document weighing in at 116 pages:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/...
Pages 52 and onwards: "Replacing franchising" details the exact vision on how those contracts are to be set up. It states:
> TfL Overground services and many railways across Europe, including local and regional services in Germany and Sweden, use a concession model to contract with private partners to operate trains. These contracts have been more successful than franchising in enabling operators to be held to account for running trains on time, delivering passenger satisfaction and controlling costs.
> Our new system of Passenger Service Contracts will build on this approach. Great British Railways will specify the timetables, branding, most fares and other aspects of the service and agree a fee with the competitively-procured passenger service operator to provide the service to this specification. In most contracts, fare revenue will go to Great British Railways, with operators delivering to the specification and managing their costs in doing so. Operators will take cost risk but will need to balance that with service quality, in order to be efficient while also meeting the needs of passengers.
> Operators will be held accountable and risk termination of their contracts if they are not delivering punctual, effcient and high-quality services. The government will retain its operator of last resort function to enable services to continue seamlessly for passengers in such cases, just as it did with Northern Rail in early 2020. Learning from the experience of the pandemic, it will adapt this function as the sector is reformed so that operators can be held to account more effectively to targets in their contracts and so that interventions can be made in the interests of passengers and taxpayers if this is required.
> Passenger Service Contracts should broaden interest and open up the market to new commercial partners, including those who can help to modernize and improve the railways by bringing expertise in technology and innovation. This diversity should increase competition between bidders and therefore create better outcomes for taxpayers and passengers alike.
It's a white paper on which there's a consensus: "this is how we would like to move forward". It's not a detailed business plan though. The entire thing only exists on paper at the moment. The next steps are working on a concrete implementation. Which can still deviate in many regards from this vision.
The UK already axed the franchising model late last year. There's a concrete need to replace it with a different model. That's what this paper is trying to answer. And there's a clear vote for a "concession model" over a "franchising model"
The questions you're posing are valid, but they pertain to the finer details. The answer you're going to get if you'd ask those involved would be: "we're going to figure this out in the next stage."
Largely, the two systems are alike. They both grant permission to an organization to operate a railway service. The difference is in how the relationship is defined.
Franchising typically is about giving license to a franchisee allowing them to use intellectual property, know-how, products and so on in exchange for a fee and adhering to a set of obligations. The franchisee then is free to setup a business selling branded services and products.
A concession contract is different. It's an (exclusive) right which is granted to a concession holder giving permit to use an asset required to operate a service. Between private parties, a typical example would be a concession stand in a sports stadium (permit is giving for you to operate a drink, food, souvenir stand on the premises). Usually, the concession holder will pay a fee to the concessionaire.
A public service concession is a subcategory, and, depending on local legislation, works in a different way. The management contract doesn't provide leeway for the concession holder as to how to operate the service. The management contract specifies almost everything: fares, timetables, performance indicators, awards/penalties and so on. The operator collects revenue on behalf of the public authority.
So, why sign up for a public service concession? Because the concession holder gets a predictable source of revenue through public funding.
The theoretical benefit to the public is that the mode of operations resides with a public body which holds responsibility, and therefor can be held publicly accountable in a direct way as to how railroad systems are operated. In practice, disparate political interests can (and will) influence and even cause friction in how these concessions are governed.
That doesn't mean franchising is necessarily the better option. In this model, public control over the entire operational aspect of railway servicing is largely relinquished to private actors, any requirements set towards franchisees only represents a minimum bar for quality of service which they need to attain.
Shifting dynamics within the private market of franchisees (actors entering/leaving/getting acquired/...) may also impact the overall reliability of services. In a concession model, there's an (perceived) assurance that the same actors will continually operate a service for a predefined period of time according to set requirements.
As to which model is "better". I think exploiting national railway services is a complex problem domain which requires specific business expertise. Beyond the occasional reading online, I can confidently say that I'm absolutely not in a position to attribute absolute value to one over the other. Especially not at a point where information for this concrete case publicly available is limited to a white paper.
Note that over the past 15 years or so, the franchises have had much more in way of obligations set on them from on-high (the Department of Transport, Transport Scotland, and Transport for Wales) than British Rail ever did, and in many ways the service provision is much more micromanaged by political motives than has historically been the case.
That said, due to the nature of franchising it was often the franchisee that took the blame for the franchiser's decisions in setting the contract (and _many_, nay, _most_ of the problems with the GB rail network come from government decisions).