Nothing changed between now and the San Bernardino case. The difference was that FBI wanted Apple to compromise device encryption, which capability does _not_ exist now.
Nothing changed between now and the San Bernardino case. The difference was that FBI wanted Apple to compromise device encryption, which capability does _not_ exist now.
How Apple CloudKit security works is documented [0] and what Apple can provide to the law enforcement is pretty easily googleable [1], and has been subject to much media coverage over the years. All I was saying is that this is not some recent change.
[0]: https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/sec3cac31735/...
[1]: https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelin...
What Apple could do seems fairly obvious: Build it into their mail client and enable it by default, no?
Support for S/MIME _is_ built into the client. The user has to configure their certificate keypairs, that part is not under the OS’s control (unless I’m missing something)
Email when encrypted end to end in the traditional ways is safe on the IMAP server but also has a requirement to back up a key off the device to prevent loss of old emails on loss of device.
Encrypting email metadata prevents emails from being delivered and processed. Metadata is as valuable as the content of the email.
Encrypting emails at rest prevents server-side services from operating, such as webmail.