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slashdot2008

>The State Department alleged some of the transmissions harmed national security, which Honeywell acknowledges with the caveat that the technology involved “is commercially available throughout the world. No detailed manufacturing or engineering expertise was shared.”

If the engines and electronics are used in commercial applications as well as military then does it matter?

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Parts can be commercially available but still export controlled, which appears to be what's going on here

That sounds like a silly contradiction of regulations and reality. Maybe I am missing something. If something is commercially available do export controls actually stop that thing from getting to prohibited countries? Or, is this a case of regulation not adjusting to the current reality?

The vendor asks for your information before selling you the part. There's two different regulations when it comes to this kind of stuff. ITAR is for pretty much anything defense related. It's not easy buying something ITAR as a regular person as most companies would probably just refuse to sell it to you unless you worked for a company doing defense work. People have gotten caught in the past by buying things in the name of their employer (or a fake shell company) and then selling it to places like China. EAR is easier to get a hold of as these parts are considered commercial dual-use technology. For example, a new microprocessor has a temperature range that exceeds the typical milspec range (-55-125C) so it's great for high temperature environments like downhole drilling equipment where it can get really hot but this chip would also work well inside the engine of an F-35. The govt has a list of specifications that if your commercial product meets them, it's classified as EAR. EAR is much more lax than ITAR as the govt doesn't want to hamper the commercial sector simply because a technology is new and better but the sames rules apply as to where these products can be exported to.

This is a clear, concise post. I'm a scientist -- an academic medical physicist. I use phase stable, digitally controllable, powerful microwave sources. 99% of the companies who sell such things and waveguides in my frequency range have pretty pictures of the latest fighter jet on their catalogue covers, as they're used there for phased-array radar, and I've come across ITAR ordering spares to a hospital!

Guess it's the same as why we have locks on doors. Won't stop someone determined, but raises the bar a bit.

Does it really raise the bar that much? Are secondary sales tracked well enough to penalize one country from buying restricted export items and selling to a restricted country?

It doesn't take very many steps to make tracking sales untenable.

It's the difference between being able to get 20 units of XYZ though a middleman in the US and being able to order 20,000 units direct from the manufacturer.

You'll find this interesting then:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_th...

>As of 2009, non-military cryptography exports from the U.S. are controlled by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security. Some restrictions still exist, even for mass market products, particularly with regard to export to "rogue states" and terrorist organizations

I'm aware of restrictions on cryptography. I just question the effectiveness of export restrictions. For commercially available products it seems like we are saying that we will only allow green crayons to be sold to countries we like even though everybody knows how to make green crayons.

To some degree, yes ITAR (or similar export controls) do make it harder to get controlled items, especially in large numbers.

There are screening processes when selling export controlled goods.

Sounds like it's talking about some sort of dual use technology that has an export control applied.

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