But yes, Covid is also incredibly expensive, and with a couple of years of hindsight we will no doubt talk about its major political impact just like we are talking about Chernobyl contributing to the fall of the Soviet Union.
1: https://globalhealth.usc.edu/2016/05/24/the-financial-costs-...
Do you suggest that the soviet union should not have collapsed?
Perhaps it could have collapsed in a better way?
It was, and rather violent: go, and cleanse the remnants of the old system. A missed opportunity now.
Instead, people let them live for them just to come back in 9 years time.
Let’s just be glad it went away and pray it never returns: it was one of the greatest horrors this Earth has ever seen.
This optimism is very premature. CPSU has morphed into Russian mafia, and the current Russian Kleptostate, and ChiComs... well just turn on the news any day.
A very positive "disaster" for multiple countries that were occupied by Russia since the end of the war. We regained our freedom and started to catch up to the NATO countries.
The nearly 50 year under Moscow's boot was a much bigger disaster and, although I was born in a communist state, I'm glad I could grow up in a now free and democratic country.
But the propaganda machine LOVED telling us how much better we had it in such an equalitarian society and what a nightmare was to live in the decadent West where the rich took advantage of the poor. We were literally waiting for capitalism to fall... while queueing in line for the allotted bread, flour and sugar rations.
They were the masters of ecology as well. Just read up what happened to the Aral Sea and, you know, the subject at hand, Chernobyl.
The people praising such a system it are either the purely evil overlords-to-be or their "useful idiots" losers blinded by desire of a of personal gain they are utterly unable to obtain in a meritocratic, free-market, capitalist system.
https://slate.com/technology/2013/01/chernobyl-and-the-fall-...
Edit: Chernobyl: The History of a Nuclear Catastrophe by Serhii Plokhy also makes a claim that the accident let to political instability in the Ukraine which certainly didn't help with the integrity of the SU.
Shouldn't you be a little skeptical, when he tries to blame one of his disasters for another?
I'm not saying Chernobyl wasn't a disaster. I'm just saying, as far as heavy industry goes $2B isn't much. I know that's hard to fathom but it's true.
Further, consider that the Chernobyl complex did already produce value, and for many years. In fact, there were four reactors at Chernobyl. No. 4 is the one that suffered the catastrophic failure in 1986.
However the remaining 3 reactors continued to operate for many years. No. 2 was shut down in 1991, No. 1 was shut down in 1996 and No. 3 was shut down in 2000.
Even that was reluctant, the Ukrainians only agreed to shut them down in exchange for assistance with the NSC and putting up 2 new reactors, Khmelnitski 2 and Rovno 4.
[1] https://globalhealth.usc.edu/2016/05/24/the-financial-costs-...
The Wikipedia page for STP talks about some $10-14B for two new reactors on the existing site. Originally applied for circa'07. If the reactors ever get built they will cut down on natural gas usage and be more more profitable than gas plants over their 25+ year lifespan.
I can only imagine a modern net-new nuclear power generation facility in the most hospitable jurisdiction would cost beyond $20B when all is said and done.
you forget the $40B in cleanup costs if no disaster happens, of course disaster or cleanup costs will be socialized in "developed" countries. all cleanup costs were grosly underestimated, in germany and everywhere else.
The current one is only designed to last 100 years.
so yes, at some point the new containment cap need not be as expensive, but by the time we have gotten to that point, the site will probably have consumed a lot more money than just building the same containment over and over again. Some future leader(s) would probably do the calculations and just say "let's build another 100-year-containment so the next generation can deal with the disposal" and pocket the money.
It's the "tech debt" discussion embodied in real life.
It's estimated that the ruins will remain highly radiactive for 20,000 years, meaning that a scarcophagus-like containment is needed at least for that long. If human technology remains as is (ok I am really hoping for tech advancements in this area), we will need to build 200 of such structures if the design specifications work as planned.
The area is only "safe" because we keep the site contained. Without renewal of the containment structure, the radiation will spread.
https://www.power-technology.com/features/making-chernobyl-s...
"Meanwhile, Reactor No. 4, now covered by the New Safe Confinement, is estimated to remain highly radioactive for up to 20,000 years. "
[1] https://www.thebalance.com/chernobyl-nuclear-power-plant-dis...
[0] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bp-deepwaterhorizon-idUSK...
That's "BP paid", I believe.
>If you think education is expensive, try ignorance.
This meant that it to work in such a way that reactivity would increase if coolant boiled away or other voids (spaces without nuclear moderating materials) formed in the fuel assembly. To keep reactions under control, it was necessary to ensure that there was always some material present to moderate the reaction.
Almost every other reactor design will essentially shut itself off if coolant is lost (negative void coefficient). This is a safety factor in case situations unexpected by the designers occur. In the event something really strange happens, the reactor turns off.
With a positive void coefficient, if something unforeseen by the designers happens, the reactor ramps up to higher output. Combine that with human mistakes in a certain sequence and safety systems that don't operate 100% correctly when the reactor is overheating and running away and you can get an out of control excursion as happened at Chernobyl.
1. Personnel who didn't understand the risks of deviating from written procedure
2. Engineers who didn't anticipate or underestimated certain failure modes and didn't design the reactor and monitoring systems with sufficient redundancy and failsafes
3. Grossly insufficient monitoring systems
4. Denial at every level once it was obvious that something was Seriously Wrong
The monitors and failsafes were there. Maybe could have been better, but they would have worked had they not been disregarded and deliberately overriden.
It was completely preventable. RBMK reactors of the same design are still operating safely today.
The issue with the fuel rods is that they were double purpose - the lower portion actually increased the reaction rate, while the upper portion decreased it. Because the team had manually fully retracted the rods, both portions were outside the reactor vessel. When it scrammed, the first portion to enter the vessel was the lower portion, which counterproductively increased the reaction rate further. This was one of several poor design choices in RBMK reactors.
You are correct that the people on shift did everything wrong at every step along the way - alongside management, who pushed forward the safety test that caused the accident on a skeleton night shift who hadn't explicitly prepared for it. The test deliberately had the reactor operating in an unusual, low-power state because it was supposed to test whether you could use momentum still in the turbines to bridge a gap until emergency diesel could be brought on line in the event of a power failure affecting the pumps that circulated coolant water to the reactor. However, the shift let the power in the reactor get too low, starving the reaction, and then took increasingly dramatic steps to attempt to bring the power back to specified (low but not that low) levels. These steps included disabling automated control of fuel rods, decreasing the rate of coolant flow, the removal of 18 of the 28 'fail-safe' control rods which were never to be removed, and disabling most of the automated scram mechanisms. Obviously, these steps were not normal procedure and constituted serious flaws in judgement.
Normal procedure would be to shut down completely when power levels drop that low, and then a waiting period and a several-hour-long startup procedure. The extremely low power state allowed a phenomenon called xenon poisoning to build up, which made restoring normal operation difficult - hence the normal procedure to shut down completley and allow the xenon to naturally decay. The attempt at restoring power despite this condition led to very unstable neutron flux, and with it unstable core temperatures, triggering alarms from several systems that were continually ignored.
Finally, the flaw in the design of a positive void coefficient (meaning that as heat goes up, water turns to steam, and the presence of the steam causes the reaction to become more efficient and produce more heat, in a runaway) actually struck, as the unstable neutron flux presumably spiked and the coolant flow was already further decreased (they had started the actual test, so the coolant pumps were being powered only by leftover momentum in the turbines). In combination, large steam voids formed, and then thermal runaway, and then a scram that actually first increased reaction rates further. (And then fuel rods fractured and many control rods got stuck at only 1/3 insertion, with the increasing portion still within the reactor). The void coefficient is why the test was supposed to take place around 700 MW, not the ~200 the operators had managed to restore; above around 700 MW the void coefficient in RBMK reactors is negative and such a runaway would not occur.
But, hey what do I know, experienced Chernobyl when it happened.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-17472698
Just to put this in perspective, the affected part of wales in something like 1,500 miles from Chernobyl. I would guess some freak of the weather conditions caused Wales to be badly affected.
Apparently there was fallout on the grass that cows would eat, resulting in radioactive milk?