And even if the servers turn out to be malicious, the clients are designed to expose as little metadata as possible with things like private contact discovery[2], sealed sender[3] and private groups[4]. It's not perfect, but the data a malicious server could collect is limited.
[1] https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/tree/master/repr...
[2] https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/
Those binaries have complete control of your keys.
If they wanted to (or were forced to) release an update that bulk decrypted all messages or those of specific people and sent them to a random server somewhere... They totally could, and likely not get caught until well after every target was exposed, if at all. Huge SPOF.
End to end encryption where only one party controls the software that controls both ends with no accountability is more marketing than security.
I am fine with Signal. They arent Facebook. And they arent Russians. Anyone who has an alternative go spend some cash and energy on marketing cause thats the hard problem not the technical details.
Any other ethnicities you don't allow?
- If a company is based in the US, they will be under pressure from the US government.
- If a company is based in Russia, they will be under pressure from the Russian government.
- If a company is based in China, they will be under pressure from the Chinese government.
This would require updating the apps but you can't decompile GP versions to source code...
[1] https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/tree/master/repr...