And if you include taxes in those fees and the benefit of deferred tax liabilities it's even harder to beat an index fund.
* It's reasonable to be skeptical about any fund having a goal that's anything other then maximizing long-term returns.
And if you include taxes in those fees and the benefit of deferred tax liabilities it's even harder to beat an index fund.
* It's reasonable to be skeptical about any fund having a goal that's anything other then maximizing long-term returns.
Buffet himself has a couple factors that help him outperform which you and I likely don’t. For one thing, he often buys private companies (not a liquid market with constant price discovery like the public stock market). That’s not uncommon, even if it’s out of reach of most retail investors. More unattainable for the rest of us, he has the “Buffett Halo” effect: stocks often go up just because he bought them! This effect also induces companies to give him a discount on equity, because the existing shareholders benefit from the halo. Obviously Buffett must still work hard to choose stocks wisely, or the halo would evaporate over time.
the “Buffett Halo” effect I dont think is fair to include. This is very real but its also temporary. Consider stuff like his failed Tesco investment. Long term we get back to fundamentals.
The big advantage I think worth mentioning is Buffet also buys control much of the time he invests. You and I buy shares to go along for the ride. He buys in on value + they ability to control direction + typically do share buybacks that further increases the per-share value and uses the companies own money to grow value further. This is a real game changer beyond the traditional value approach you and I will never have.
I confess to having drunk the Kool-aid and can report that I no longer have investment anxiety.
One thing to be cautious of here is that people often overinvest when they have some sort of advantage, and become way too over-leveraged in one single area.
I remember a calculation from a college finance class. Imagine you have an otherwise "optimal" portfolio with 1% of its assets in a particular large stock, but you know that the real average returns of that stock are going to be ~2x what the market is expecting. So you recompute the efficient portfolio with this new information and find the new optimal weight of the stock and it's only something like 2-3% despite having a very strong information advantage over the market.
But most people would think this sounds crazy. "I've got a crazy inside stock tip that it's worth double what everyone else thinks? Shouldn't I put at least 10% of my money in there?" No. Diversity is a hell of a value-add in a portfolio.
Nothing can be.
> * It's reasonable to be skeptical about any fund having a goal that's anything other then maximizing long-term returns.
I really don't think it is. If I'm a sophisticated investor, I may want to invest in funds which hedge against tail-risk, or provide broad exposure to some specific sector, etc. Neither of these things are about maximising returns relative to the S&P500. There are strategies with negative expected returns in the long-run, but when added to a portfolio can improve its returns. Portfolio construction can get very complex.
And, regarding being skeptical of things like "hedging risks" and "complex portfolios," I don't know. I'm just not sure enough hedge funds really do a great job handling tail risks to not be skeptical of all of them as a group. And, surely sophisticated investors can target specific sectors and build arbitrarily complex portfolios (if they're into that sort of thing) with passive things like ETFs for much lower fees on their own.
I'm not talking about all hedge funds managing tail risk for their own portfolios, but funds which are designed to do nothing but hedge against tail risk. They provide a valuable service, and a small allocation to such a fund in concert with a large holding in the S&P500 will often outperform the S&P500, even if the fund itself loses money.
This isn't clear to me. To me it seems rather that this is a bet against hedge funds. I can see a way to your interpretation but it does not seem as likely to me.
Quoting the shareholder's letter from 2016 [1], the actual bet was "that no investment pro could select a set of at least five hedge funds – wildly-popular and high-fee investing vehicles – that would over an extended period match the performance of an unmanaged S&P-500 index fund charging only token fees. [...] For Protégé Partners’ side of our ten-year bet, Ted picked five funds-of-funds whose results were to be averaged and compared against my Vanguard S&P index fund."
Do tail-risk-targeting hedge funds have a better incentive than 2-and-20? Honest question, I have no idea. I assume 2-and-20 drives shooting for the moon and closing the fund if it doesn’t work out.
Interestingly, most managers actually do match the S&P500, but before fees. I don't have a link handy, but there have been some academic papers on their performance.
To majorly out perform or underperform you have to be drastically different.
so what exactly are you paying them their fees for then?
Either way, for an active manager to be worth their fees, they _have_ to beat the index by more than their fees plus a bit more to make up for the risk that they don't. Otherwise, you'd be better off in a passive fund.