SHA and MD are fast hashers. You want slow hashers for password security like b-crypt and s-crypt.
Yeah, over 20 years ago. It's woefully out of date by modern standards.
PBKDF2 doesn't even attempt memory hardness, so there are whole classes of attacks on later generation slow hashing algorithms that don't even apply to PBKDF2 because of how old it is. Argon2 is extremely resistant to Time-Memory-Trade-Off (TMTO) attacks, which older algorithms like bcrypt and scrypt are vulnerable to.
PBKDF2 is essentially a linear slowdown, which is effectively pointless these days.
bcrypt and scrypt, the successors to PKDF2, are both more than a decade old.
RSA is half a century old and it's still up to date by modern standards. In fact nobody has came up with anything better.
Edit: Actually, bcrypt might be as far as 1999, possibly older than PBKDF2.
RSA is currently a minefield of gotchas and few security companies even get it right. Just generating a good key is actually a very difficult task. It is also very computationally slow and has many practical issues for the level of security it provides.
There are many superior replacements in both pqc and elliptic spaces. I would take EdDSA over rsa-pss any day of the week.
EdDSA is another level entirely. I don't know how you can recommend elliptic curve cryptography with a straight face if you think RSA is hard.
P.S. It's a myth that EdDSA is faster. This depends on operation (signing vs verification) and key size.
The private key is a byte string and the quality of it only depends on the random generator. It’s trivially fast to generate 32 bytes of decent quality random numbers these days. There are many insecure rsa generation methods with weak criteria. Too many are fossilized in libraries and crypto cores. Rsa also has half a dozen padding schemes and most are now considered weak or vulnerable.
EC is generally considered much stronger for a much smaller key size.
Why does it have to be linear? Just use 1M irritations today, 2M irritations next year, 4M irritations the year after that, and you'll have an exponential version of it.
You can even take your 1M irritated hashes from this year and execute an additional 1M more irritations on them to update them to 2M irritations when you want to upgrade.
In practice, bitwarden's server limits the max iteration count on a user account to something that remains insecure. They refuse to fix it.
Having 2fa enabled on all other accounts it makes me sleep better if somehow one day BW or any other password manager gets compromised.
This has nothing to do with my usage.
255! vs 255! / (255 - 30)!
My math could be off though, i haven't work with factorials since i was in the university
With unknown size, cracking 30 characters takes time proportional to n^30 + n^29 + n^28 etc.
Cracking just 30 is proportional to n^30.
The difference is negligible. A percent or two.