Even if an official seeks no further office and is "impotent" at the time of payment, the prospect of speaking fees can still be a perverse incentive. There's no evidence this is happening here, but theoretically an official could install policies favorable to a company, then be rewarded after leaving office with outsize speaking fees, and this would be a stable system of corruption because the company would have the reputation of following through on a practice of rewarding officials who produce favorable policies.
One could take this further and apply it to the entire concept of a revolving door; if an official can make a career out of lobbying and consulting after leaving public office, they'll be incentivized to prioritize future employers over the public interest.
Realistically, it's difficult to fully remove perverse incentives and still be able to attract talent (this applies to technical recruiting as well!). But there still need to be systems of accountability. Unfortunately, with two-party non-proportional representation, and a limited opportunity for voters to provide referendums on the corruption of party members separate from their policy viewpoints, there are many layers of insulation that prevent people from being held to account.