Producers are subservient to consumer demand. No amount of production can force a consumer who refuses to change their consumption into buying an alternate good. If a town demands exclusively kosher bread, bakers cannot survive by baking non-kosher bread to sell to them.

Block producers (miners) must find buyers for the blocks they produce, if they don't find buyers, they go bankrupt.

>changes to update the Bitcoin protocol need to be accepted by the miners

You've got it backwards, changes to Bitcoin need to be accepted by block consumers (node operators). If they don't demand those changes, blocks with those changes don't get produced.

Demand and supply are fundamental components to economic action. The steal man version of your argument is: "While consumers induce production, some consumers' demands might be flippant -- They signal they will only buy kosher bread but they'll accept an alternate good. Though production switching costs are practically zero in SHA256 PoW, and entry into production is non excludable, an adversary has enough funding to pay premiums to producers to forego market demand, for the good they produce, longer than consumers are willing to refrain from consumption -- inducing a consumer-demand shift."

In game theory and economics its not a dominating strategy which is indicative of the many failed attempts to cartelize SHA256 PoW