"Verifiers SHOULD NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., requiring mixtures of different character types or prohibiting consecutively repeated characters) for memorized secrets. Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically)."
Without those other mitigations, pw rotation may still help more than it hinders, although I am definitely not a fan of it and recommend implementing all of the NIST’s recs instead.
For those looking to head that route, haveibeenpwned offers an API to check hashes against previous breaches. For a pw strength meter, have a look at zxcvbn.
My guess is the idea is to mitigate compromise of very old passwords, spray attacks using breached site creds, reduce insider threat and at least offer some mitigation for compromised hashes.
I think this is wise compared in work environments - 90 days, 180 or even 360 would be a good mitigation over _none_ to too many.