> software engineering hasn't killed enough people to advance
and where it had, you get pretty serious control and certification process put in place to avoid it (Boeing notwithstanding)
and where it had, you get pretty serious control and certification process put in place to avoid it (Boeing notwithstanding)
The MCAS software was modified to read from both angle of attack sensors and to be less aggressive in pushing the nose of the plane down. The software that controlled the indicator light that illuminated when the two angle of attack sensors disagreed was also fixed.
While reviewing the software systems, a number of other software issues were found.
The wiring bundle issue was also found during these reviews.
https://www.barrons.com/articles/these-6-issues-are-preventi...
> The MCAS software was modified to read from both angle of attack sensors and to be less aggressive in pushing the nose of the plane down.
That strikes me as a design issue in the domain of aeronautical engineering, rather than in software engineering. Software engineers aren't the ones with the domain expertise to determine the right aggression parameters.
> The software that controlled the indicator light that illuminated when the two angle of attack sensors disagreed was also fixed.
I thought the issue was that the sensor-disagree warning light was not included as standard, it was sold as an optional extra. [0]
> While reviewing the software systems, a number of other software issues were found.
Interesting, I wasn't aware of that. If I understand correctly these issues aren't thought to have a direct bearing on the crashes.
[0] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/business/boeing-737-max-w...
But the biggest defect was the decision that the pilots didn't have to be told about the risk (to avoid retraining and certification costs). If they had been told the pilots/airlines may well have protested about the lack of redundancy. All those higher ups in Boeing and the FAA should be in prison.