Unfortunately, you missed that the author's proof does not actually prove inferential undecidability (sometimes called "inferential incompleteness") of Russell's Principia Mathematica for the following reason:
The [Gödel 1931] proposition *I'mUnprovable* does **not** exist in Principia Mathematica because it violates restrictions on orders of propositions that are necessary to avoid paradoxes (such as Russell's Paradox). Gödel numbers (and in the author's case Lisp expressions) leave out the order of a proposition with the consequence that the Diagonal Lemma **cannot** be used to construct the proposition *I'mUnprovable*.
Furthermore, existence of the proposition I'mUnprovable contradicts the following fundamental theorem of provability that goes all the way back to Euclid: A theorem can be used in other proofs.
See the following article for further details:Instead of plowing through the disjointed repostings,
readers may be better off looking at the articles linked in https://professorhewitt.blogspot.com/.
Also, there is a video here:
See the following for more up-to-date information:
The article linked below explains why [Gödel 1931] did not prove inferential undecidability of Russell's Principia Mathematica and likewise why the formalization of [Gödel 1931] in Lisp proof being discussed is also invalid:
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3603021
However, the article linked above does have a correct proof of inferential undecidability (also known as "inferential incompleteness").
Would be happy to respond to any questions that you might have.
The word "inferential" has to do with being able to be logically inferred, that is, deduced.
Russell's Principia Mathematica specified that each proposition must have an order to block paradoxes such as Russell's paradox.
See the article linked above for further explanation.
Existence of the [Gödel 1931] proposition I'mUnprovable is inconsistent with the following theorem to the effect that theorems can be used in proofs:
⊢∀[Proposition Ψ] (⊢Ψ)⇒ΨIf a proposition is not provable, yet raises no issues if regarded as true, then it can be added as an axiom and used in theorems.
there must exist infinitely many propositions that are
inferentially undecidable, that is, can be neither proved nor disproved.
However, the propositions cannot be specified constructively
and so are not very interesting.
Currently, there seem to be no propositions interesting to
practical Computer Science that are provably inferentially
undecidable.
⊢∀[Proposition Ψ] (⊢Ψ)⇒Ψ
The above theorem is completely standard mathematical notation. ⊢∀[Proposition Ψ] (⊢Ψ)⇒Ψ
is not jargon. Instead, it is standard mathematics.I'm pointing it out because its use is not so innocent. Jargon is often used to obfuscate meaning, especially when it means something that would otherwise be easy to say plainly.
I point it out only because your work here is so good that it feels wrong not to smooth out any small splinters.
Thank you for making this!