And that's where the housing bubble analogy comes in: there are many good reasons to buy a house, but doing so because you expect its value to increase constantly is not one of them.
And that's where the housing bubble analogy comes in: there are many good reasons to buy a house, but doing so because you expect its value to increase constantly is not one of them.
This works with Housing, at a fundamental level if people decided to more houses one year the price increases, and if people buy fewer houses one year the value of your house decreases which can quickly cycle though to dramatic shifts. However, if fewer people decided to get a degree the value of your degree increases.
Similarly, there would not be an education bubble without federal loan guarantees -- certainly they have escalated cost of college, and most of the shady for-profit colleges thrive on student subsidies.
There is also plenty of blame to spread around. EX: Irish http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish_property_bubble burst 2008. UK http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_property_bubble burst 2008. Australian http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_property_bubble (yet to burst) etc.
What is really interesting is how little the price could increase before market forces brought things back to reality. Housing is such a large percentage of the worlds wealth that we never saw the sort crazy multiples over value that other bubbles get to. EX: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_asset_price_bubble
When the government regulates the currency & credit markets tightly, then government should share in the responsibility for the bubble.
It looks like a jigsaw. If you look at a chart of actual numbers, it's pretty clear that the countercyclical tools available to the fed diminish the effect of bubbles.
PS: Many bubbles are simply money looking for somewhere to hide. Assume the US cut it's military budget by 80% and paid of the debt in 20 years, where do you think that money would end up?
I beg to differ. You could have pulled the full cost of every defaulted mortgage out of the bottom line of a single big-5 investment bank and not even bankrupted it. But we had all these crazy hyper-leveraged instruments that turned a 50 billion dollar problem into a 5 trillion dollar problem. The issue wasn't the mortgages, it was the leverage and gambling.