I'm unsure if the complaint about the timing attack makes sense in the uint64 version. I know that you're supposed to use "constant time" algorithms for security, so i'd be interested to hear if my thinking on this is wrong. Does the uint3/uint6 timing attack work with uint64?

I've "greyed" bits coming off of random radio waves from the atmosphere in order to test randomness; the drivers i was using for the particular radio didn't allow on-the-fly amplifier adjustments, so if there was, say, a lightning strike within 50 miles, the front-end would get overloaded and "blank" - send mostly zeros, even with incredibly fast AGC control. So entropy wasn't guaranteed unless i could guarantee there wasn't lightning within some predetermined distance of the receiver (as an aside, i have this capability now) - thus for long (96 hour) runs to gather entropy, i'd have to fiddle the output to ensure uniform distribution.

Now, with all that said, there was a side channel attack; if there was a lightning storm or other sort of high energy event near my receiver, an "attacker" could determine that the algorithm to ensure uniformity was contributing more to the bits than the atmospheric noise. Possibly.