Until recently (or still) pretty much none of them had production usable implementations anywhere for any application, and most academic coverage has mostly been a glib "trivially you can do that"-- ignoring that naive "obvious" implementations end up being completely insecure.
Why would you need this to be the case? In my mind (im not an expert) I just imagine schnorrs batching signatures into one tx on the chain. And then its done. Why would you need to add years after?
In Bitcoin today we can do things like make a conditional signature in a multi signature. With three parties, one can pre-sign a transaction and lock it until a future date, then hand it to the other parties who can sign it at their leisure when that time is elapsed. This would not be possible with schnorr unless you also had the expectation that all parties would be online when the lock time expires.
Yes, to get the space/validation improvements you can get from schnorr you need interaction. But it's perfectly possible to use it in the same way as ECDSA, it only adds options, it doesn't remove them. For some applications the requiremetn that the participants isn't a big deal and they can enjoy those benefits, otherwise they don't.
It is like watching a state-capital system versus a free-er market compete.
People in the state-capital system have completely binary things to argue about, with dissidents being shunned while everyone is stuck in a quagmire of false dilemmas. Third and fourth and additional options are not considered.
Whereas in the free-er market, people are allowed to take risks and fail, fail with LOTS of money and value, and iterate en masse towards solutions that are most "useful" ideally, but also service a variety of use cases.
It does not its irrelevant it chances nothing about bitcoin or its limits. Its a client side it does not speed up usage or something the CPU just useless less cycles and idles more.