Nuclear engineer here. I've read through a good portion of the regulatory submission to the NRC and have a few takeaways that oppose some of the less-well-informed takes in this thread:
- The reactor differs substantially from existing PWRs by encasing the primary in double containment, using natural circulation flow for both normal operation and emergency cooling. There are no pumps needed (or installed) to move coolant through the reactor.
- During normal operation, the primary is entirely contained within the primary containment, and circulates naturally, using the differential temperature and gravity. The steam system can is used to remove heat.
- During an emergency, valves open to admit the reactor coolant into the backup containment. These valves are normally held shut by hydraulics with positive control from electronics-- their failure mode is to open with no other operator action in case of a loss of power. No additional operator action is needed to initiate the emergency cooling flow, which is also a natural circulation loop to the backup containment shell, which then conducts heat to the pool.
- The backup containment shell is designed to withstand hydrogen explosions such as those that occurred at Fukushima, and which was possibly prevented at Three Mile Island by venting (whether there was a hydrogen explosion at TMI-2 is not fully understood).
- There is no mechanism for positive reactivity addition via graphite moderator rod such as in the Chernobyl design. The specific failure mode at Chernobyl is not possible with this reactor.
- The pool is specified as a stainless-steel-lined reinforced concrete and designed to withstand earthquakes. The safety systems are such that no reactor electricity supply is needed to remove heat-- the pool could be filled e.g. from a fire truck, and the immediate decay heat from shutdown does not require any additional heat removal or water addition. So the failure mode we saw at Fukushima (inability to remove decay heat due to loss of electricity) and hydrogen explosion breaching containment does not apply to this design.