But the real danger with torrents is when you're actually sharing the data. Any of the IPs you connect to could be a malicious peer who will later track down your IP through legal channels and send you abusive notices.
I guess the way to protect yourself there is to torrent only over a VPN or through a seedbox.
It’s not perfect, but puts up enough obstacles for me to feel better about it than some fly-by-night VPN
Can switzerland even be considered "non-cooperative"? I mean, most people probably think so because of their reputation as a an "offshore bank", but that's been eroded due to the passing of FATCA.
- Downloading copyrighted material, even from obviously shady sources, is perfectly legal.
- Sharing said material with your friends, even if you obtained it from an obviously shady source, is perfectly legal.
- Sharing it with random strangers (as happens while torrenting) is not legal, but hard to prosecute, because:
- private companies collecting IP addresses to sue uploaders violate privacy laws, and thus commit a crime themselves (!) [1]
I didn't check, but I'd also assume:
- That ISPs and VPN providers aren't required (and quite likely even aren't allowed) to disclose the identity behind an IP address to a private entity
- That VPN providers (unlike ISPs) aren't required to maintain such logs, and thus typically don't.
For comparison, in Germany, downloading from "obviously illegal" sources is prohibited, further sharing a copy from such sources among friends is prohibited (and since breaking copy protection is prohibited too, having a DRM-free copy of the content is a pretty strong indicator that it comes from an illegal source - unless you got it from a Swiss friend...).
[1] https://www.weka.ch/themen/it-technik/it-sicherheit-und-rech...
Is there a single i2p universe or do you have separate self hosted instances. What does i2p offer that Tor doesn’t? Are there active sites or communities it is it just a routing layer?
You could also run the BitTorrent Kademlia DHT on top of Tor, without any explicit tracker needed; just with Tor hidden-service BitTorrent client nodes publishing the hidden-service addresses of other client nodes to the DHT ring.
(I often wish that the Tor overlay network was IPv6-based; then "hidden-service addresses" could just be IPv6 addresses in a particular IPv6 public subnet, reserved to represent the Tor overlay network. Then client software wouldn't need to know anything about Tor in order to take advantage; making a client "only operate over Tor" would just be a matter of giving the client an IPv6 subnet mask to restrict what it was willing to connect to; or putting it in a network namespace that was so-restricted.)
Also onion service v3 addresses, which are entire ed25519 public keys, won't fit in an ipv6 address (haven't checked base 32/36/whatever for v2 onion addresses, but surely also won't fit in, say, a /64).
Tor relays, while more numerous than exit nodes, are still limited (we're discussing a custom onion service communication setup here, not using Tor for general purpose BT which would use exit nodes). Anyone can run one, and please do so if you have good bandwidth each way. Relays are opt in because not only does it open you up to lots of bandwidth usage, but Tor shouldn't default to running a relay for those that may be philosophically opposed. Relays pass all data through anonymously and encrypted, but some still may not feel comfortable doing it. So there are limited operators.
As for the nature of Tor itself, to keep both the client and onion service operator anonymous, they communicate through a rendezvous which means a Tor circuit for each side (each Tor circuit is 3 hops iirc). And geographic distance is intentionally disregarded, so it may traverse the world multiple times over.
I have considered running a private Tor network with directory servers replaced with a DHT, forcing everyone to be a relay, and then essentially running a private BT over that, but it'd need significant adoption to be viable. Also, there may be Tor limitations in huge numbers of relays (and definitely issues with slow relays), I haven't checked. Finally, in addition to traffic analysis attacks that always exist, it is believed iirc lately that federal agencies are sitting on Tor exploits (granted may only be for exits and/or Tor browser).