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Comment by anon946 | Hacker News Reader

One possible deficiency is that the time of the possible exposure is not revealed, which may make it hard for manual vetting. Only the date is revealed.

Regardless, the fact that no location is revealed will make it hard for manual resolution of false positives. On the other hand, if location was revealed, likely fewer people would opt-in, so there are both advantages and disadvantages of not using location at all.

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Which is why I am confused. What stops a person from having 2 phones. 1 at home, so when they need to go to an institution that requires tracing verification, they use the other device they know is clean? Unless the primary you use, will automatically broadcast to that one? But, what stops a user from turning your daily off. Unless BLE can communicate even when off?

I'm not sure if you understand, but your phone keeps a record of when it encountered *other users who were infected, and the time of contact as well. If another user becomes sick, we can assume they were contagious for the whole day.

I mean when the exposure occurred. I reviewed the API, and it seems that it only gives the date. So, if we want to try to manually vet false positives, such as through drywall, etc., it may be harder.

Your device can and probably should save the time and location if available at which rolling identifiers are received along with the rolling identifiers.

In my review of the API, it seems that that information cannot be retrieved.

This is an API issue, not a protocol issue.

Looking at the Android API docs, it looks like Google does not trust government apps and so provides only limited data and alerts the user with a popup when the app asks for information.

It's not clear why Google doesn't provide the UI themselves, although maybe they intend to do so at a later time?

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