The weakening of structures that allow political journalists to expose corruption is not a small issue and should be discussed on its own.
In other words, I'm asking: "Why does this topic not deserve its own conversation?"
That's not "one of the bigger issues" of the bill. It's not even that interesting as an issue -- journalists have other ways to talk to sources. Deep Throat didn't use "end to end encryption".
But not allowing end to end encryption affects all of society (e.g. everybody's text messages, chat, and voice calls), not just some specific use case of a specific line of work.
Do you think that a system like this won't be abused in targeting journalists trying to expose corruption? Surely that's a big issue.
Journalists however, having a special need to protect their sources, and being aware of a potential lack of E2EE can always find other ways - similar to what they used to hide their sources before E2EE, when their phones could be tapped, etc, including intermediaries, face to face meetings, etc.
Journalists might be hurt from killing E2EE, but theirs is less of an issue (and they can take precautions). The big issue is with masses lacking E2EE.
Except now there's stingray towers, scraped social media profiles, phone metadata, databases of license plate reader data, Palantir, CCTV with facial recognition, Clearview AI, and an army of private tech companies attempting to create detailed profiles of everyone on the internet and selling that information to god knows what malicious actors/governments.
As technology has progressed, journalists have accordingly updated their methods for protecting sources. E2EE is one of the technologies in the 20th/21st century that is essential to that end.
This could even have totally perverse impacts: suppose that China can read your messages, but all you care about is that your provider is not hosted in the US?