If unencrypted iCloud back ups is the price for us getting to keep fully encrypted devices, so be it
>Starting in Android Pie, devices can take advantage of a new capability where backed-up application data can only be decrypted by a key that is randomly generated at the client. This decryption key is encrypted using the user's lockscreen PIN/pattern/passcode, which isn’t known by Google.
>By design, this means that no one (including Google) can access a user's backed-up application data without specifically knowing their passcode.
https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...
This is cliche as can be, but the trade off is security for convenience.
Fact is, iOS is consumed largely by people who want convenience. They don’t want to lose all of their data if they forget their passwords.
But for those people who are ok with that type of unforgiving paradigm, then don’t use iCloud backups, and you’re all set.
I see this in the thread. What does that mean? Do they have to? Are they being forced? What is the balance between?
Why aren't iCloud backups e2e encrypted?
If Apple is privacy-oriented, they should've allowed this long time ago. Unlike iCloud backups, this is certainly not a legal issue, as the "local" backups stored on one's computer are already fully encrypted.
* My memory says I spent way too much on an iPhone. My ego says that can't be true, and in the end memory yields. -nietzsche