1. Drive MCAS with only one AOA sensor.
2. Don't tell MCAS to look for (or even think about) bad AOA data or AOA disagreements.
3. Equip airplane with two AOA sensors as usual, but make the AOA disagree warning light a "value added option" that customers have to pay extra for.
4. Don't actually bother to tell pilots that they don't have AOA disagree warning lights.
5. Don't bother to tell pilots that MCAS exists at all.
6. Don't test MCAS subsystem to see what it actually does with bad AOA data.
7. Give MCAS a ridiculous amount of control authority, operating cumulatively over repeated applications to exceed what the pilot can manually override.
8. Change how the trib stab switch has been wired since 1966 and not tell pilots.
How any engineering team let this through is unfathomable. Don't blame the MBAs or the unions. Didn't these guys get the lecture about the Hyatt?