I think 'garbage' is a strong word, but I believe what the original poster is trying to say is that there are a lot of binaries, packages, and libraries that most organizations will consume from upstream, and not verify directly. This requires either trust on a third party (often many third parties - in the case of open source), or more intense validation of those components and any changes to those components.

Binary Authorization for Borg performs verification for pieces that come out of Google's CI/CD pipeline. For third party code, see in the doc, "When importing changes from third party or open source code, we verify that the change is appropriate (for example, the latest version)."

Disclosure: I work at Google and helped write this whitepaper on Binary Authorization for Borg.

Literally anything that comes from a vendor in a package? Percona server/toolkit? Every binary package in Ubuntu? The Linux kernel as built and distributed by Red Hat?